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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A normative experimental study was undertaken to establish whether engaging in positive, 
negative, and neutral mental imagery affected the reaction rate of participants to positive, 
negative, and neutral word stimuli. The sample consisted of computer literate, English 
speaking participants with no history of clinical disorders. A total of 80 participants took part 
in the study, with 40 participants from either gender. The results of a factorial ANOVA 
indicated that the type of mental imagery engaged in had a significant effect on the rate at 
which participants responded to stimuli (p=.00023, F=8.4057), whilst the emotional valence 
of the stimuli did not have a significant effect (p=.30503, F=1.1877). However, the 
interaction between the type of mental imagery and the emotional valence of the stimuli was 
highly significant (p=.00794, F=3.4576), thereby indicating that engaging in positive or 
negative mental imagery did bias participants towards a faster reaction rate to positive or 
negative stimuli respectively.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
An old adage claims that every cloud has a silver lining. Yet pessimists steadfastly refuse to 
see the positive side of a negative situation, whilst optimists adopt a more positive focus. 
Could this difference result from pessimists imaging the situation to be worse than it really is 
whilst optimists envision the situation more favourably? If a person’s expectation of the 
world influences how that person interprets the world, could those expectations be 
manipulated in order to alter how the world is seen? Previous research has indicated that 
people can be instructed to think about situations differently, which does affect how such 
people view situations (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009). However, as detailed in the following 
chapter, the efficacy of such verbal thought alteration leaves much to be desired. This raises 
the question as to how else such expectations can be altered, with one possibility being to 
consider whether mental imagery would not be more effective in changing how a person 
views a situation. If a person engages in positive imagery, does that influence the person to 
process positive information faster than if the imagery were neutral or negative? Put another 
way, can positive mental imagery bias the person to preferentially process information in a 
positive light? Conversely, does engaging in negative mental imagery result in that person 
being more biased towards negative information? As the way in which a person interprets 
information plays a role in the aetiology and maintenance of emotional disorders such as 
depression (Holmes et al., 2009), a better understanding of how mental imagery interacts with 
the types of stimuli which a person processes could lead to important advances in the 
identification and treatment of such disorders. 
 
 
1.2 Problem statement and research aims 
 
As can be seen from the introduction, much is still unclear about the relationship between a 
person’s mental imagery and how that influences the person’s view of the world. The main 
aim of this study is therefore to further the understanding of the link between mental imagery 
and the valence of stimuli, as well as to explore whether this may influence the processing 
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rate of stimuli. This is done by examining how various mental imagery scenarios affect the 
rate at which emotionally valenced stimuli are reacted to. To this end, it is hypothesised that 
engaging in positive mental imagery will result in a person being quicker at responding to 
positive stimuli. Vice versa, negative mental imagery will bias a person to react to negative 
stimuli faster than to either positive or emotionally neutral stimuli.  
 
One of the main premises of this study is that a person’s expectation of a situation makes that 
person more likely to interpret the situation accordingly. For example, a neutral event such as 
going to a place for the first time may be influenced by one’s expectations. Thus, if a person 
hears that the service at a new restaurant is slow, that person may try out the restaurant with 
the expectation of receiving slow service, and may rate the service as being slower than they 
would have otherwise rated the service. The idea that expectations influence a person’s 
interpretation of situations gives rise to questions such as whether it is possible that a person 
with depression interprets a neutral situation negatively because he or she expects the 
situation to be negative. Studies have indeed shown that people suffering from emotional 
disorders, such as depression and anxiety disorders, have thinking styles heavily influenced 
by cognitive biases, such as negative interpretation biases (Holmes et al., 2009). An 
interpretation bias occurs when there is an increase in the likelihood that an ambiguous 
stimulus will be construed as either being positive or negative, depending on whether the 
interpretation bias is itself positive or negative (Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davidson, & 
Holmes, 2012). In such a case, a person with depression would automatically process 
negative cues in his or her environment faster than positive cues, and may even allocate 
increased cognitive resources to the processing of negative cues, at the expense of positive 
ones. This shows that biases can result in faster processing of stimuli. But what exactly is 
meant by “faster processing”? 
 
Although the central assumptions underlying this study will be elucidated further in Chapter 
2, it must be noted that the core foundation of this study is that a cognitive bias will lead to 
faster processing of certain stimuli, with the hypothesis under investigation being that mental 
imagery can be used to establish a cognitive bias. As is noted by Calvo, Avero, Castillo, and 
Miguel-Tobal (2003), how stimuli are processed cognitively is greatly affected by the 
emotions which are evoked by the stimuli. Emotional stimuli which have a similar valence to 
one’s own current emotional state have been found to be processed preferentially over other 
dissimilar valenced stimuli. Studies indicate, for example, that when a person is anxious 
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about something, he or she preferentially processes threat related stimuli, and is therefore 
faster at recognising threatening stimuli than any other stimuli, as can be seen in studies 
which examine event-related potentials (Calvo et al., 2003). Furthermore, Lang and Bradley 
(2009) demonstrated that stimuli which are emotionally salient or valenced are preferentially 
attended to when distracting stimuli are non-valenced.  In other words, relevant stimuli are 
attended to preferentially, and therefore processed faster, especially when competing stimuli 
are deemed not to be relevant. However, the mechanics of how emotionally valenced stimuli 
are processed will be discussed more fully later in the chapter, in the section entitled “1.5 
Stimulus Valence”. Nevertheless, the hypothesis which is to be tested through the current 
study is that this faster processing can be induced through the use of mental imagery. Bearing 
this in mind, the key concepts underlying the study will now be examined. 
 
 
1.3 Cognitive Bias Modification 
 
Before going on to define cognitive bias modification, one must first understand what is 
meant by cognitive biases. Thus, this section will start out by exploring what is meant by the 
term “cognitive bias” before going on to look at Cognitive Bias Modification theory and how 
such cognitive biases can be altered. 
 
 
1.3.1 Cognitive biases 
A cognitive bias can be broadly defined as a belief being formed even though such a belief is 
not entirely justifiable logically (Haselton, Nettle, & Andrews, 2005). From an evolutionary 
standpoint, cognitive biases fall into three basic categories: Artifact, Error management, and 
Heuristic biases. Haselton et al. (2005) defines these three types of cognitive biases as 
follows: Artifact biases refer to those biases which are an outcome of research strategies and 
typically result from flawed research designs. Error management biases on the other hand 
usually involve factoring the cost-effectiveness of various options before selecting the 
seemingly least-costly error when searching for solutions. Finally, heuristic biases arise as a 
method of increasing information processing efficacy, for example through the use of 
stereotypes. Although cognitive biases are normally seen as adaptive, they may become 
maladaptive, which may contribute to the development of emotional disorders (Lang et al., 
2012). For example, Levens and Gotlib (2010) propose that a cognitive bias which maintains 
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negative information in working memory may explain why people with depression have a 
negative mood more often than people who do not have depression. 
 
This study focuses on heuristic cognitive biases, as its aim is to uncover the degree to which 
mental imagery influences the processing speeds of various types of stimuli. The heuristic 
explanation of cognitive biases theorises that such biases are a result of attempts at 
overcoming limitations in information processing resources. This premise is based on the 
information processing paradigm, a theory which inherently assumes cognitive resources to 
be limited (Hertwig & Todd, 2003). According to this system, the two key limitations on 
cognitive processes are storage capacity and the capacity of information processing, and it is 
further hypothesised that these limitations present a burden which constricts cognitive 
potential. To compensate for these limitations, adults utilise cognitive shortcuts which allow 
them to deal with environmental demands, especially when such tasks are unfamiliar 
(Hertwig & Todd, 2003). Thus, in the context of this information processing theory, cognitive 
biases may be seen as mental shortcuts which allow a person to process information faster 
(Haselton et al., 2005). There is a myriad of different types of cognitive biases, including 
social biases, memory biases, and error biases, each of which can have a great impact on how 
a person perceives, attends to, and processes incoming sensory information. Most pertinent to 
the current study is the attentional bias in which a person is preferentially attentive to certain 
cues in his or her environment, at the expense of other salient cues (Bar-Haim, 2010). As 
noted by Bar-Haim (2010), attention biases mainly occur at a subconscious level making it 
difficult for conventional therapy to directly manipulate such biases. This in turn results in 
difficulties treating disorders which are founded on biased cognitive processes. Consequently, 
it has been found that maladaptive attentional biases, especially those formed in response to 
emotionally charged information, are an integral part of current models of emotional 
disorders, and such cognitive biases affect how the person interprets and attends to 
information, as well as influencing what information the person remembers (Browning, 
Holmes, & Harmer, 2010).  
 
But this still leaves the question concerning how cognitive biases are observed in 
experiments. Studies on cognitive biases typically rely on baselines of the behaviour under 
study. Thus, cognitive biases may be observed as normative deviations (Caverni, Fabre, & 
Gonzalez, 1990). In other words, the strength of a cognitive bias can be determined by the 
degree to which the biased behaviour differs from the typical baseline of that behaviour.  One 
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must also consider when and how these biases occur. There has been some debate as to 
whether attentional biases are automatic or strategic. In other words, automatic biases occur 
without the participant being consciously aware of recognising the stimulus, whilst strategic 
biases occur when the participant can consciously recognise the stimulus. However, a recent 
review of past research suggests that both automatic and strategic attentional biases may take 
place, with one preceding the other based on the demands of the task being undertaken 
(Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009). It has been proposed that this attentional bias occurs 
through a two-stage process. In the first stage, known as the registration stage, the stimulus is 
roughly analysed for its relevancy to the well-being of the person, being judged on whether or 
not the stimulus is positive or negative. The second or allocation stage of the process then 
allots attention and other cognitive resources to the processing of the stimulus (Cisler et al., 
2009). These two stages occur automatically; however, shifts in attention may occur either 
automatically or strategically, depending on the demands of the task. 
 
In the case of this study, participants are asked to categorise words as being positive, 
negative, or neutral. Because this is to be done as fast as possible, processing speed is 
increased at the expense of accuracy. According to the heuristic theory, participants will rely 
on past exposures to the stimuli to facilitate and speed up this categorisation (Haselton et al., 
2005). However, it is unclear whether this increase in speed is caused by increased attention 
to the preferred stimuli, or whether there is a decrease in the ability to disengage from the 
preferred stimuli, thereby lengthening response rates to non-preferred stimuli (Cisler et al., 
2009). As is noted by Cisler et al. (2009), attentional biases are a robust phenomenon. 
However, when it comes to the role of cognitive biases in the maintenance of emotional 
disorders, Hirsch, Hayes, and Mathews (2009) suggest that such a bias towards negative 
information could be countered by increasing the bias towards interpreting ambiguous words 
in a benign fashion. For example, studies conducted using both clinical and non-clinical 
samples have indicated that a more frequent accessing of a benign meaning of ambiguous 
situations was correlated with a decrease in anticipatory anxiety in socially stressful situations 
(Hirsch et al., 2009). However, there is no research investigating whether such training may 
decrease non-clinical emotions or increase the experience of positive emotions, a gap which 
will be addressed by the current study. 
 
To summarise, there are many types of cognitive biases; some are useful and adaptive in that 
they enable a person to process information faster, but some may become maladaptive, and 
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may play a role in the development of emotional disorders. Now that cognitive biases have 
been explored, the definition of cognitive bias modification can be examined. 
 
 
1.3.2 Origins of Cognitive Bias Modification 
As cognitive biases have been found to play a role in several disorders, there have been 
endeavours to treat such disorders through attempts at modifying or altering existing 
cognitive biases, often employing computer protocols to implicitly retrain or modify 
maladaptive biases (Bar-Haim, 2010). Based on these attempts at altering cognitive biases, an 
experimental paradigm, named cognitive bias modification (CBM), has been developed in 
recent years. Primarily developed to examine the causality of individual differences in 
information processing (Lang et al., 2012), CBM has helped to explain the roles between 
emotion, expectations, and how a situation is experienced.  
 
As a research technique, CBM has proven to be useful in evaluating the emotional and 
behavioural consequences caused by experimentally manipulating a person to have a 
particular cognitive bias, and has primarily been used in research documenting individual 
differences in emotional vulnerability (Hoppitt, Mathews, Yeind, & Mackintosh, 2010; Lang 
et al., 2012). Initially used as a means by which the causality of anxiety could be 
experimentally inferred in a laboratory setting, this method became invaluable in helping 
researchers to develop a better understanding how emotional disorders are formed and 
maintained. Only more recently has CBM research expanded to include other behavioural 
and emotional outcomes of cognitive biases (MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009), with a separate 
branch of CBM, interpretation targeted CBM or CBM-I, aimed at better understanding 
interpretation biases (Holmes et al., 2009). Using this technique, a person can either be 
trained to have a specific interpretative bias when processing new stimuli, or CBM-I can be 
used to modify how the valences of existing stimuli are processed. Although CBM-I is still a 
very new technique, results thus far have been encouraging, and suggest that, with repeated 
trials, participants can be trained to have a persistent interpretation bias (Holmes et al., 2009). 
There is some evidence that through a process of attentional retraining, automatic attentional 
biases can be eliminated or altered. For example, retraining people to have a negative bias 
can be important in understanding the aetiology of affective disorders such as depression, 
whilst retraining a person to have a positive interpretative bias can improve therapeutic 
interventions (Holmes et al., 2009). For example, in the case of alcohol dependency, studies 
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have indicated that CBM has helped to modify the attentional bias of heavy drinkers, 
resulting in a decreased urge to drink (MacLeod et al., 2009). CBM has also had success in 
altering the attentional bias in anxiety, with CBM resulting in the modification of activity in 
the lateral prefrontal cortex when exposed to emotional stimuli (Browning, et al., 2010). 
 
Whilst some studies claim that people can be trained to interpret stimuli more positively or 
more negatively (Standage, Ashwin, & Fox, 2010),  it was previously not clear whether these 
findings represented a direct manipulation of attentional bias, or whether the retraining 
condition altered the mood of the participant, so that a change in affect caused the observed 
shift in interpretation bias. However, Standage et al. (2010) demonstrated that change in 
mood state does not have a significant effect on interpretative biases. This finding 
substantially increases confidence in CBM research, and eliminates changes in mood state 
being seen as a confounding variable. Thus, recent cognitive modification techniques have 
made it possible for direct chains of causality to be examined, rather than just exploring 
associative relationships. 
 
 
1.3.3 Core model of Cognitive Bias Modification 
In terms of underlying neuronal models, CBM can be explained by focusing on biasing 
signals. There are two biasing signals which guide how attention is allocated to the stimulus, 
one being inflexible and automatic, and the other being more flexible and strategic 
(Browning, Holmes, Murphy, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2010). In the first system, the amygdala 
sends out a signal which allocates attention to the salient stimulus automatically. The second 
system, which comes into effect when stimuli exert conflicting demands on attention, relies 
on the production of a signal originating in the prefrontal cortex. In both cases, the signal 
triggers the association and sensory cortices, and allocates attention more to certain stimuli 
than to others, thereby making the processing of preferred stimuli faster. Thus, as an 
intervention, CBM works by mediating the function of the two biasing signals, and in so 
doing alters the attention which is allocated to the stimulus (Browning et al., 2010). In other 
words, this attentional retraining changes the activation of the association cortex triggered by 
an emotionally valenced stimulus. This activation has been manipulated pharmaceutically in 
the past. For example, antidepressant medication reduces the activation of the amygdala’s 
signal to the association cortex when presented with a threatening stimulus, whilst increasing 
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the activation when the stimulus is positive (Browning et al., 2010). This shows that 
attentional habit can be changed by influencing how stimuli are initially appraised, rather 
than altering the habit at a later stage when control processes of a higher order come into 
effect. Given that this is possible pharmaceutically, the question arises as to whether a similar 
alteration of attentional habit is possible cognitively, such as through the use of mental 
imagery. This study is therefore designed to address this question by examining whether 
mental imagery can affect the reaction rate of participants to emotionally valenced stimuli. 
But this leads to the question as to what exactly is mental imagery? 
 
 
1.4 Mental imagery 
 
Mental imagery is defined as using sensory information from multiple modalities to form a 
mental representation of an image (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). According to Pearson, 
Deeprose, Wallace-Hadrill, Burnett-Heyes, and Holmes (2013), a mental image can be 
created in one of two ways. In the first instance, a person can use current perceptual 
information to create an image directly; as an illustration, if a person were to look at a 
photograph of a mountain, that person would be able to create a mental image of a mountain, 
and retain this image even if he or she was to close his or her eyes. The other method through 
which a person could create a mental image is without the aid of current perceptual 
information, rather just utilising stored information (Pearson et al., 2013). To continue with 
the example, in this instance, the person could form a mental image by combining various 
aspects of stored information about mountains, such as that mountains are high, or that they 
may be snow-capped.  
 
Mental imagery has been used in clinical settings for several decades. For example, Beck, 
Emery, and Greenberg (1985) stated that so-called “visual cognitions” could be used in the 
then new field of cognitive behavioural therapy to alter emotions and cognitive processes. 
Although initially mainly used for the treatment of traumatic memories, the applications of 
mental imagery have grown to be more diverse over the years (Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker, 
2007). There is a great body of research supporting the importance of the role of mental 
imagery in a variety of psychological disorders. Negative mental imagery has been found to 
be central in the formation and maintenance of disorders such as post-traumatic stress 
disorder, various eating disorders, obsessive compulsive disorder, social phobias, borderline 
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personality disorder and other personality disorders, depression (Holmes et al., 2007), anxiety 
disorders, schizophrenia, and attention deficit hyperactive disorder (Bar-Haim, 2010), as well 
as various substance abuse disorders (MacLeod et al., 2009). Yet despite these findings, the 
use of mental imagery in clinical psychology still does not represent the full potential of 
mental imagery research (Pearson et al., 2013). 
 
fMRI studies have indicated that the areas of the brain used when engaging in mental 
imagery are very similar to those used in visual perception (Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 
2004), with a study conducted with reaction time tasks indicating that response rates to both 
mental images and visually perceived images being comparable (Broggin, Savazzi, & Marzi, 
2012). According to Ganis et al. (2004), broadly speaking, both mental imagery and visual 
perception activated a greater number of common neural structures in the frontal and parietal 
cortices, and activated fewer common areas in the occipital cortex. In terms of the frontal 
cortex, both imagery and visual perception activated a number of the gyri, including the 
inferior and medial frontal gyri, the precentral gyrus, and the anterior cingulate gyrus. Several 
gyri in the parietal cortex were also activated by both imagery and visual perception, 
including the left angular gyrus, the postcentral gyrus, and the supramarginal gyrus (Ganis et 
al., 2004). What was interesting to note was that both mental imagery and visual perception 
activated the fusiform gyrus in the temporal cortex, a neural structure more commonly 
associated with facial recognition (Banich & Compton, 2011). Furthermore, several areas of 
the cerebellum were also activated in both mental imagery and visual perception. Despite the 
extensive overlap between the areas used in each task, the areas activated during imagery 
were only a subset of those utilised during visual perception (Ganis et al., 2004). In other 
words, objects which are imagined mentally elicit the same emotions as if that object were 
visually observed. Engaging in visual mental imagery triggers the retrieval of perceptual 
information from long-term memory, allowing the participant to form a subjective impression 
of the image (Ganis et al., 2004). There is some research to indicate that the emotions evoked 
in mental imagery are also present in the interpretation of a situation. An attentional bias to 
threat has been well documented, and a person’s threat threshold can be lowered, making that 
person more attentive to threatening situations (Bar-Haim, 2010, Hoppitt et al., 2010; Burack, 
Enns, & Fox, 2012). Further studies on anxiety show that, when confronted with a stressful 
situation, people high in trait anxiety tend to interpret ambiguous stimuli as significantly 
more threatening when compared to less anxious people. This bias in how a person interprets 
information leads to an even greater increase in anxiety (Standage et al., 2010), thereby 
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linking interpretation biases and emotions. Similarly, a negative cognitive bias goes some 
way in explaining the causality of depression, with cognitive theories of depression ascribing 
the onset and the maintenance of depression to a negative interpretation bias (Lang et al., 
2012). A related study examining negative biases showed that people suffering from eating 
disorders have an attentional bias to cues relevant to food or weight (MacLeod et al., 2009). 
However, there is less research on emotions which do not manifest in clinical disorders in 
their extremes, such as those represented by a mildly negative or positive affect. Thus, one of 
the aims of this study is to examine whether engaging in negative imagery can make a person 
more sensitive to negative stimuli. Conversely, does exposure to positive mental imagery 
enhance a person’s ability to distinguish positive stimuli? (Please see Section 2.7 for a full 
review of the aims and research questions of this study) 
 
With regard to the use of mental imagery in CBM, studies have indicated that positive 
material which is verbally processed has a different effect on mood than positive mental 
imagery has (Holmes et al., 2009). More recent studies indicate that this finding holds true for 
both positive and negative mental imagery (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). Holmes et al. (2009) 
found that participants experienced a more positive mood after having imagined a positive 
event through mental imagery than after they had processed similar positive information 
verbally. Other studies indicate that a deeper understanding of negative mental imagery could 
have a greater effect on reducing suicide rates than is possible with the more typical 
therapeutic focus on negative verbal thoughts (Holmes et al., 2007). Because of the increased 
efficacy of mental imagery relative to cues which are processed verbally, mental imagery 
(when combined with CBM techniques) has the potential to be more effective than traditional 
CBM techniques which utilise briefly presented visual cues or verbally presented emotionally 
ambiguous stimuli. 
 
 
1.5 Stimulus valence 
 
Before looking at stimulus valence, one must first consider how to categorise stimuli as being 
emotional stimuli or neutral stimuli. But before this can be considered, one must first 
understand why a person intrinsically reacts to some stimuli, but not to others. From an 
evolutionary perspective, a person is most likely to attend to a stimulus that evokes emotions 
which are relevant to that person’s survival, which in turn engages the sensory systems which 
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control perceptual processing and attention allocation (Lang & Bradley, 2009), thereby 
allowing the person to react to the situation. The underlying neural circuitry, known as the 
motivational circuitry, has two systems: the first of these systems is defensive and is used in 
the processing of negative affect, whilst the second system is appetitive and deals with 
positive affect (Lang & Bradley, 2009). Whilst these two systems may be regarded as being 
separate, there nevertheless is some overlap in the neuronal circuitry on which they are 
structured, although the degree of this overlap is debatable (Barberini, Morrison, Saez, Lau, 
& Salzman, 2012). In both systems, once sensory information has been processed by the 
relevant sensory cortices and projected to the thalamus, the amygdala processes the emotional 
component of the information (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2011). However, although the 
amygdala forms part of both the appetitive and defensive systems, activation of the amygdala 
is greater in the defensive system. The defensive system then divides after the information 
leaves the amygdala, with projections leading to the hypothalamus, which codes for 
autonomic responses, and to the midbrain, which is involved in the processing of somatic 
information (Lang et al., 2011).  The appetitive system on the other hand has more 
projections to the orbitofrontal cortex (Barberini et al., 2012). 
 
Emotional stimuli can therefore be defined as being any stimulus which elicits a response 
from either the defensive or the appetitive motivational circuits of the brain. In other words, 
an emotional stimulus is a stimulus which prompts either a strong aversive or a strong 
approach response. For example, a stimulus which may activate the appetitive circuitry could 
“feast”, whilst a stimulus that may activate the defensive circuitry would be “attack”. Neutral 
stimuli, on the other hand, do not have any strong or intrinsic associations with the 
motivational circuits, and do not elicit any response from this particular circuitry, such as the 
word “table” (Bradley, Keil, & Lang, 2012). This motivational model of emotion has been 
proposed in an effort to explain why emotionally valenced stimuli are preferentially 
processed relative to non-valenced stimuli (Weins & Syrjänen, 2013), and several studies 
support the notion that activation of the motivational circuitry leads to increased resource 
allocation as well as dedicated perceptual processing (Bradley et al., 2012). However, there 
has been some debate as to whether one system is more dominant than the other. In a study 
done by Lang and Bradley (2009), it was demonstrated that stimuli which are emotionally 
salient or valenced are preferentially attended to when distracting stimuli are non-valenced. 
This preferentiality may be explained by the fact that a person relives a particular emotion 
when processing knowledge pertaining to that emotion, as is pointed out by Niedenthal, 
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Winkielman, Mondillon, and Vermeulen (2009). In other words, when deciding whether a 
stimulus is negative or positive, the person will rely on previous emotions which have been 
evoked by the stimulus. The idea that emotionally valenced stimuli are processed faster than 
non-valenced stimuli is contained in the notion of motivated attention, a bottom-up type of 
attention which is driven by the emotional features of the stimulus (Weins & Syrjänen, 2013). 
Thus, motivated attention refers to the increase in attention given to emotionally valenced 
stimuli which are relevant to a person’s biological survival. 
 
Now that it has been clarified that stimuli receive differing amounts of attention, it is 
important to expand on what is meant by the term “stimulus valence”. The valence of a 
stimulus can range from positive to negative (Lithari et al., 2010). For example, it could 
range from pleasure to disgust. The valence of a stimulus has been found to influence several 
cognitive processes. For example, memory encoding, perceptual processing, the amount of 
attention dedicated to a particular stimulus, and how a problem is solved, are all influenced 
by how positive or negative the stimulus is perceived to be (Sakaki, Niki, & Mather, 2012). 
Furthermore, the greater the emotional valence of the stimulus, the greater the attentional 
resources allocated to that stimulus (Kuhbandner, Hanslmayr, Maier, Pekrun, Spitzer, 
Pastötter, & Bäuml, 2009), meaning that highly positive or highly negative stimuli will 
receive more attentional resources than neutral stimuli. The valence of a stimulus is indeed 
such an important feature that positively valenced words enhance hemispheric asymmetries, 
whilst negatively valenced words may actually reverse existing hemispheric asymmetries 
(Alfano & Cimino, 2008). This has been hypothesised to be caused by the asymmetrical 
presentation of arousal across the hemispheres. Alfano and Cimino (2008) found activation of 
the left hemisphere when positively valenced words were presented to participants, whilst the 
presentation of negative stimuli activated the right hemisphere, thereby suggesting that any 
advantage which the left hemisphere in processing language is reversed when the valence of 
the stimuli is negative. 
 
Nevertheless, care must be taken when drawing assumptions from the conclusion that the 
valence of a stimulus affects how the stimulus is processed. Just because the processing of 
emotionally valenced stimuli is enhanced does not necessarily mean that the identification 
process is increased due to greater accessibility to information about the stimulus. 
Zeelenberg, Wagenmakers, and Rotteveel (2006) instead propose that emotionally valenced 
stimuli are implicitly biased, thereby making their identification easier. In other words, due to 
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their emotional significance, emotionally valenced stimuli are perceived and reacted to faster 
than neutral stimuli in much the same way as implicit priming works; this has been shown in 
a number of paradigms, including an attentional-blink and a two-alternative forced-choice 
paradigm, and can also be seen when analysing event related potential components 
(Zeelenberg et al., 2006). Furthermore, this bias may either be a processing bias or a resting 
level bias. In the first case, a processing bias can be said to occur when non-discriminative 
information about a stimulus has a higher probability of being interpreted as either 
emotionally relevant or not. Conversely, a resting level bias occurs when one type of 
stimulus, such as a neutral stimulus, has a resting level which requires more activation than 
another type of stimulus, such as an emotional stimulus (Zeelenberg et al., 2006). For 
example, this model would propose that an emotionally salient word like “coffin” has a 
higher resting level than a neutral word such as “wood”, which results in less activation 
needed to identify “coffin”, which in turn leads to a faster recognition of the word “coffin”. In 
an effort to see how much of the faster processing of emotionally valenced stimuli was due to 
bias and how much was due to enhanced processing, Zeelenberg et al. (2006) devised a 
means of untangling the two effects. Their findings showed that the effect of enhanced 
processing was much greater than that of any inherent bias. This may indicate that a bias may 
only affect the processing of emotional stimuli if the stimuli are visually similar. However, 
their observations are clearly indicative of the fact that emotionally valenced stimuli receive 
enhanced processing resources when compared to neutral stimuli. (Please see section 2.6 of 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of the base assumptions concerning cognitive architecture made in 
this study). 
 
With regard to the processing resources allocated to stimuli, there are other factors which 
must also be considered. Kuhbandner et al. (2009) report that a person’s affect can influence 
the style in which that person processes information, with a negative mood resulting in a 
bottom-up processing style, and a positive mood making a top-down processing style more 
likely. As biases are seen as a higher cognitive function (Caverni et al., 1990), it can be 
hypothesised that biases are more prominent when a top-down processing style is engaged, 
although this remains unclear. Likewise, mood can also affect the brain’s alpha wave 
frequency, thereby affecting how stimuli are consciously perceived. Similarly, findings show 
that a person’s processing style can affect that person’s mood and can play a significant role 
in mental health (Lang et al., 2012). However, some questions have arisen as to whether 
biases cause the emotional state, or whether the emotional state causes the biases (Hoppitt et 
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al., 2010). Thus, a further aim of this study is to clarify this point. A neutral condition will be 
tested first to see if any of the participants have pre-existing cognitive biases. As this 
condition tests for pre-existing biases, assuming that there are no pre-existing biases, any 
biases observed in the two experimental conditions can then be regarded as a direct result of 
the mental imagery, thereby allowing claims of causality to be made. In terms of processing 
style, Kuhbandner et al. (2009) state that as bottom-up processing occurs faster, people are 
faster at recognising negative rather than positive stimuli. On the other hand, Hoppitt et al. 
(2010) claim that the healthy, non-clinical population has a slight bias in perceiving positive 
stimuli as this helps to shield them from negative emotions. The current study will shed some 
light on this difference in opinion, as the neutral condition of the study is aimed at identifying 
any pre-existing biases. Thus, the results of the current study will be able to provide evidence 
to resolve this conflict. 
 
At this point, it is clear that emotionally valenced stimuli are given greater attentional 
resources than non-valenced stimuli, but this still leaves the question regarding the means 
through which this occurs. How attention is allocated to emotionally charged stimuli is often 
explained using the biased competition framework (Browning et al., 2010). According to this 
model, biasing signals can be seen to influence attention to either be focused towards or away 
from the stimulus in question. The perceived salience of the stimulus is linked to bottom-up 
processing by the amygdala, which plays a role in directing attention towards the stimulus. 
The anterior cingulate cortex and the lateral prefrontal cortex, on the other hand, detect and 
resolve processing conflicts, and employ a top-down method of processing which maintains 
attention towards a particular stimulus, even when distracting stimuli are present (Browning 
et al., 2010). In other words, the amygdala-based system orients attention to a stimulus, 
whilst the anterior cingulate cortex and the lateral prefrontal cortex play a role in the 
maintenance of attention to the stimulus. Thus, based on these neuroanatomical models, 
negative attention biases may arise due to disruptions in either pathway, whilst a positive 
attention bias is reflected by increased activity in the amygdala (Browning et al., 2010). For 
the sake of clarity, this is diagrammatically represented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.1: Diagrammatic representation of the Biased Competition Framework 
 
Browning et al. (2010) have further hypothesised that emotional disorders may be primarily 
caused by a shift in the preferential reactivity to valenced information of the two systems, as 
opposed to a change in the function of the systems. Put another way, in order for an 
intervention to be successful, the intervention should be targeted at changing the attentional 
preferences of the systems, rather than trying to affect the efficacy of the systems. 
 
The underlying hypothesis of this study, namely that positive mental imagery would result in 
a faster reaction rate to positive stimuli, and that negative mental imagery would speed up 
recognition of negative stimuli, are based on the take-the-best algorithm. This algorithm 
employs a decision tree structure, which holds that when making a decision, if only one 
possibility is recognised, then that possibility will be selected. If all possibilities are 
recognised, then a salient cue identified with each of the possibilities is examined. This will 
continue until one possibility will have more salient cues than another (Haselton et al., 2005). 
The hypothesis of the current study states that by engaging in positive mental imagery, the 
imagery would make positive stimuli easier to recognise, which would enable the participant 
to categorise a positive stimulus as being positive faster than they would be able to categorise 
negative or neutral stimuli. In other words, when having to categorise a stimulus according to 
its valence, only one possibility is correct for each stimulus, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that that particular possibility will be selected. Conversely engaging in negative mental 
Emotional stimulus 
Biasing signal Biasing signal 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex, 
Lateral Prefrontal Cortex 
Amygdala 
Orients attention to stimulus Maintains and disengages 
attention to stimulus 
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imagery will increase the recognition time of negative stimuli, but not positive or neutral 
stimuli, again allowing only one possibility to be recognised and therefore selected.  
 
To summarise, when a participant is presented with a stimulus, the stimulus is roughly 
scanned for its biological relevance. If the stimulus is not relevant, it is not processed further. 
On the other hand, if the stimulus is deemed to be relevant, a decision is made on whether the 
stimulus is negative or positive, and based on this information, the stimulus is then allocated 
a certain amount of attention. The more relevant the stimulus, the more attention it receives, 
and the faster the stimulus can be processed. As information processed through mental 
imagery has been shown to evoke more emotions than the same information processed 
verbally, this study hypothesised that mental imagery would have an effect on attentional 
biases by increasing the relevance of the stimulus, thereby increasing the processing rate of 
relevant stimuli.  
 
 
1.6 Outline of chapters 
 
The contents of this report have been split into five chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the 
topic under consideration, provided an overview of the context of the problem, outlined the 
aims of the study, and has clarified the key concepts of the study. The second chapter 
introduces and appraises the fundamental constructs which underlie the study, and presents a 
critical review of previous literature in the field upon which the current hypotheses are based. 
Chapter 2 also critically examines the design of previous CBM research, highlighting how the 
current study addresses the short-comings of previous research. Chapter 3 summarises the 
research method, sample, measurement instrument, and the data analysis methods of the 
study. The results obtained from the data analysis methods are then provided in Chapter 4, 
with visual representations and statistical analyses of trends in the data where relevant. 
Chapter 5 discusses the implications of these results, and what inferences can be drawn from 
them. The chapter also contains information regarding the limitations and contributions of the 
current study, as well as recommendations for future research, before closing with a 
concluding statement.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Chapter 1 provided a contextualised overview of the research problem, introduced the aims of 
the current study, and elucidated the key concepts underlying the hypotheses. The purpose of 
this chapter is therefore to expand on this by demonstrating how these key concepts fit 
together to form the topic being studied. In addition, a thorough examination of past research 
will be chronicled, including the strengths and weaknesses of previous studies. To begin with, 
research pertaining to the reaction rate to emotionally valenced stimuli will be reviewed, 
before moving on to the more central issue of how mental imagery affects reaction rates in 
general. After this issue has been fully examined, the fundamental and most prominent topic 
concerning how mental imagery affects the reaction rates to emotionally valenced stimuli will 
be explored. Once these issues have been comprehensively reviewed, a critical assessment of 
past research and the implications of this evaluation for the current study will then take place. 
 
 
2.1 Reaction rate to emotionally valenced stimuli 
 
For the sake of this dissertation, the terms “reaction rate”, “response rate”, and “reaction 
time” are used interchangeably. Before going on to look at how reaction rates are influenced 
by emotionally valenced stimuli, it is important to first have a better understanding of how it 
is that such stimuli are processed relative to other stimuli. The emotional valence of a 
stimulus is one of the most basic, yet most important aspects of stimulus processing. 
Emotional stimuli play a vital role in informing how a person effectively interacts with the 
environment, with much evidence pointing to the fact that behaviour may only be successful 
if salient emotional stimuli are detected and responded to (Gianotti, Faber, Schuler, Pascual-
Marqui, Kochi, & Lehmann, 2008). For example, if a person is presented with a stimulus 
which is either threatening or rewarding, the stimulus triggers the neural motivation circuitry 
previously discussed, which orients the person to the stimulus, and facilitates attention 
towards the stimulus. This in turn assists the person in choosing and implementing an 
appropriate response to the stimulus (Bradley et al., 2012). Several researchers have shown 
that the emotional significance of a stimulus is automatically processed by a person, often 
skipping the more elaborate cognitive processing prompted by non-emotional stimuli; indeed, 
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information about the emotional content of a stimulus has been found to be accessible at the 
primary stages of stimulus processing (Phelps, 2005). In other words, before a person is even 
consciously aware of a stimulus, the emotional relevance of that stimulus has already been 
processed. This unconscious processing of emotion affects whether or not a person becomes 
aware of the stimulus and identifies it, and also directs how much attention is initially 
allocated to the stimulus in question. In this way, the initial processing of the stimulus has a 
great impact on the later processing stages (Phelps, 2005).  
 
Once the initial processing of a stimulus is complete insofar as the stimulus has been 
identified and attention has been allocated to the further processing of the stimulus, then the 
emotion-evoking aspect of the stimulus is examined. As is noted by Weins and Syrjänen 
(2013), stimuli vary in their ability to elicit a person’s attention, with stimuli which are 
judged to be more important capturing attention more than stimuli deemed to be less 
important. Of the various stimuli, emotionally valenced stimuli are more relevant to a 
person’s survival, and are therefore intrinsically more important than non-emotionally 
valenced stimuli. According to Greenberg, Tokarev, and Estes (2012), a person remembers 
and recognises words which have an emotional valence better than neutral words, and is also 
faster at recognising emotionally charged words. Multivariate studies have shown that the 
manner in which an emotional stimulus is categorised is dependent on two dimensions, 
namely valence and arousal (Gianotti et al., 2008; Grider & Malmberg, 2008), where valence 
is defined as the subjective emotional value of a stimulus, and arousal is defined as the 
subjective intensity or excitement caused by the stimulus. Both valence and arousal are 
thought to exist along continuums; in the case of arousal, the continuum runs from a state of 
calmness to a state of excitement, whilst the two extremes of the valence continuum are 
pleasant and unpleasant (Gianotti et al., 2008). These two dimensions are not entirely 
separate: Grinder and Malmberg (2008) report that the two dimensions are positively 
correlated, with more highly valenced stimuli being more arousing, and vice versa.  
Responses to stimuli are dependent on where the stimuli fall on these two continuums, with 
fMRI studies indicating that each of the two dimensions have their own separate neural 
network. In a study done by Gianotti et al. (2008), it was found that once a stimulus word was 
presented, it took an average of 118 milliseconds for information about the valence of the 
stimulus to be inferred by the participant. However, information about the arousal of the 
stimulus was only extracted 266 milliseconds after the onset of the stimulus presentation. 
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These results clearly indicate that information about the valence of a stimulus precedes 
information about the arousal dimension of the stimulus.  
 
It has been well documented that the amygdala is, to a large extent, responsible for the 
processing of emotional information, especially when the information is fear related. 
However, neuroimaging studies have shown that amygdala activation is arousal dependent 
(Gianotti et al., 2008). In other words, the amygdala only becomes activated if stimuli are 
highly arousing, regardless of their valence. Furthermore, the amygdala is also involved in 
emotional memory, and modulates the amount of arousal that is allocated to hippocampal-
dependent memories, where hippocampal-dependent memories can be defined as those 
memories which are explicitly expressed and are consciously available (Phelps, 2005). The 
implications of these findings are that both the positive and negative emotionally valenced 
stimuli presented in this study would have caused the activation of the amygdala, which 
would have then allocated attentional resources to relevant stimuli. 
 
Although based on inconsistent findings, research shows that there is interplay between 
processing of emotional information and various cognitive processes, with each affecting the 
other (Kousta, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 2009; Kellermannet al., 2012).  The emotions 
experienced by a person whilst performing goal directed cognitive tasks may either facilitate 
or impair the person’s performance, depending on which cognitive process is being utilised, 
what the valence of the stimuli is, and how vulnerable the person is emotionally (Kellermann 
et al., 2012). The effects of emotions, however, have been shown to be dependent on the 
cognitive load of the task being performed (Kellermann et al., 2012). In terms of the current 
study being conducted, the mood state of participants will play a very small role, as not only 
is the cognitive load of the study minimal, but the sample will also be drawn from a non-
clinical population, thereby ensuring that the emotional vulnerability of the participants is 
low. 
 
Now that the mechanisms through which emotional stimuli are processed are understood, it is 
time to look at how various factors influence this processing to produce variations in reaction 
rates. Gender and age are two such influencing factors. Although the amount of research on 
gender differences in emotions is limited, it has been found that gender differences exist both 
in how men and women process emotions and in how they react to emotions (Lithari et al., 
2010). In general, these findings suggest that females are more responsive to emotional 
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stimuli than males, particularly if the stimuli are related to danger. In terms of ageing, in the 
field of developmental psychology it is a well-established fact that there are differences in the 
speed-accuracy trade-off made by younger and older adults. From a generalised point of 
view, on the one hand older adults typically make more accurate decisions than younger 
adults, but on the other hand, younger adults are faster at making decisions than their older 
counterparts (Starns & Ratcliff, 2010). In the context of the current study, this finding would 
imply that older adults may take longer to categorise the stimuli than younger adults, thereby 
resulting in longer reaction times. However, one factor which influences response time is 
boundary separation. According to this construct, the speed at which a decision is made is 
dependent on the amount of information needed to make this decision (Starns & Ratcliff, 
2010). In other words, the greater the amount of evidence which must be accumulated in 
order for the alternative choice in a decision to be accepted, the slower the decision is made 
to avoid jeopardising the accuracy of the decision.  
 
A further factor which affects reaction rate is the cognitive demands of the task being 
performed. Neuroimaging studies have shown that the amygdala becomes activated during 
the implicit processing of salient stimuli whilst the orbitofrontal cortex appraises the strength 
of the valence of the stimulus (Kellermann et al., 2012). The higher the cognitive demands of 
the task being performed, the more suppressed the activation in these two areas is. As both 
emotional and non-emotional stimuli must compete for attention, it had previously been 
assumed that increased cognitive demands caused participants to miss irrelevant stimuli 
(Kellermann et al., 2012). However, more recent studies suggest that the increased cognitive 
demands of a task lower the reactivity of the affective network to less relevant emotionally 
valenced stimuli, thereby increasing the amount of attentional resources which are available 
for the processing of more relevant emotional stimuli (Kellermann et al., 2012). As the 
cognitive load of the current study is small, the reactivity of the affective network will not 
have to be suppressed, resulting in unaffected processing of the emotional stimuli. 
 
In addition to this, studies have indicated that arousal is greater for stimuli which are 
potentially dangerous (Lithari et al., 2010), indicating that the inherent attributes of a stimulus 
can affect the reaction rate of a person to that stimulus. For example, if a stimulus presents a 
threat to the person, the attention allocated to that stimulus is greater than the attention 
allocated to less threatening stimuli.  Kousta et al. (2009) theorise that this may be because 
recognising and therefore avoiding a threatening stimulus is more valuable to a person's 
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survival than recognising and approaching a rewarding stimulus. According to the automatic 
vigilance model of emotion, negatively valenced stimuli automatically trigger a mechanism 
which allocates attentional resources to the negative stimulus at an earlier point in time than 
to other stimuli (Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, & Del Campo, 2010). This model has, 
however, been contested, with other researchers claiming that negative stimuli are not 
allocated more processing resources than other stimuli, but rather that negative stimuli 
capture attention for longer than do other stimuli, which may cause negatively valenced 
stimuli to be processed more slowly than other stimuli in certain tasks. A meta-analysis 
conducted on relevant research concluded that much of this slowing of negatively valenced 
stimuli could be attributed to lexical characteristic differences between studies (Kousta et al., 
2010). In other words, characteristics of words such as how frequently a word is used and the 
length of the word affect the rate at which a stimulus is responded to. However, at the same 
time, other studies have indicated that stimuli which are associated with rewarding outcomes 
are also allocated more attention than non-rewarding stimuli (Lithari et al., 2010; Bradley et 
al., 2012). In an effort to resolve this conflict of opinions, Kousta et al. (2010) designed a 
study to address the weaknesses in previous research designs. Their findings indicated that 
both negatively and positively valenced stimuli are processed more quickly than neutral 
stimuli. These results have been replicated on numerous occasions, and it is now a commonly 
accepted fact that both positive and negative stimuli elicit not only a faster response rate than 
neutral stimuli, but also that emotionally valenced stimuli are more accurately identified than 
neutral words, regardless of their polarity (Zeelenberg et al., 2006). As the stimuli used in this 
study are chosen because they present either a threat or a reward to a person’s biological 
well-being, both positive and negative stimuli should been allocated similar amounts of 
attention. This effect of attention allocation has also been seen in studies on anxiety, with 
anxious people recognising threatening stimuli faster due to the increase in attention which is 
allocated to threatening stimuli, thereby allowing such stimuli to be processed faster than 
other stimuli (See, MacLeod, & Bridle, 2009). This indicates how an attentional bias may 
result in the faster processing of certain stimuli relative to others. As indicated previously, 
this central assertion underlies the hypotheses of the study, which aims to uncover whether 
such a cognitive bias could also be induced through the use of mental imagery.  
 
Reaction rate to emotionally valenced stimuli is also affected by the amount of anxiety being 
experienced by the person as they encounter the stimuli. One interesting finding has indicated 
that anxiety may reduce the amount of available working memory capacity, potentially due to 
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the anxious person engaging in excessive worrying (Hirsch et al., 2009). This may result in 
reduced cognitive resources being available for the processing of new information, which 
may in turn reduce the reaction rate of that person to non-threatening stimuli (Hirsch et al., 
2009). However, as this study relies on a non-clinical sample, it can be assumed that such a 
negative bias will have no influence on the results of the study.  
 
To sum up, there are several factors which influence a person’s reaction rate to emotionally 
valenced stimuli. Of these factors, some were inapplicable in the context of this study, as they 
are only observed in clinical populations, or are only seen when the cognitive load of a task is 
high. However, some factors, such as highly valenced stimuli and gender differences are 
relevant in the context of this research, and will thus be further explored, and the findings will 
be described in chapter 4.   
 
 
2.2 The effects of mental imagery on reaction rates 
 
The previous section of this chapter has shown that reaction rates to stimuli are influenced by 
various factors, as well as documenting in detail how emotionally valenced stimuli are 
processed and reacted to. However, a more central question arises:  how does mental imagery 
differ from information processed through other modalities in terms of reaction rates? Does 
mental imagery have the same effect on reaction rates as information processed verbally or 
visually? This question and other related questions will now be addressed in this section.  
 
Firstly, how does mental imagery affect cognitive processes compared to information 
processing in other modalities? Recent studies have indicated that mental imagery has 
different and more pronounced cognitive outcomes when compared to verbal processing of 
the same material. For example, mental imagery can be used to increase positive affect and to 
decrease anxiety, and has also been found to induce a robust interpretative bias (Holmes et 
al., 2009). In fact, in one study, positive verbal instructions lost their efficacy over the course 
of the training sessions, and even began to enforce a negative interpretation bias, a result not 
observed in the mental imagery condition (Holmes et al., 2009). In terms of the effects of 
mental imagery on reaction rate, studies have shown that mental imagery has a greater effect 
on reaction rate than verbal instructions, although these same findings suggest that this effect 
is even larger when using pictures of stimuli as opposed to mental images of the same 
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stimuli. It has been proposed that this may be because pictures share a greater number of 
perceptual and sensory properties with the objects they represent than do mental images of 
the same object (Bradley et al., 2012). This finding is in line with those reported in section 
1.4 of Chapter 1, which suggest that the brain areas activated in mental imagery are a subset 
of those activated in visual perception (Ganis et al., 2004). Pearson et al. (2013) state that the 
vividness of the mental image is also dependent on the attentional resources which a person 
has at their disposal, suggesting that the vividness of a mental image may differ form one 
person to another, depending on the availability of attentional resources. However, as one of 
the aims of this study is to test the potential of new therapeutic methods which can be 
delivered without the presence of a therapist, it is essential to test a method which relies on as 
few outside resources as possible. Based on this logic, it is seen to be far more effective to 
study the effects of mental imagery on the modification of cognitive biases, as mental 
imagery can be engaged in at virtually any point during a person’s daily routine.  
 
Thus, although not as effective as using pictures, mental imagery has been found to cause 
faster reaction rates than verbal processing. This may be due to the fact that mental imagery 
has a perceptual correspondence which is lacking in verbal information processing. In other 
words, when using mental imagery, sensory experience is directly accessed, making the 
imagery more realistic by simulating real-life perceptions; verbal information processing, on 
the other hand, does not access this sensory experience, resulting in poorer emotional 
activation (Holmes et al., 2009). The neural circuitry used when engaging in mental imagery 
is very similar to the circuitry used when remembering past events or envisioning what the 
future would be like (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007), and it has been suggested that this  
difference between mental imagery and verbal processing can explain why mental imagery 
causes faster reaction rates. Furthermore, a difference between information processed 
verbally as opposed to information processed through the use of mental imagery is that 
cognitive bias modification retraining using verbal instructions was actually found to lower 
positive affect over time, as well as to increase the state anxiety of the participants (Holmes et 
al., 2007). As the current study is conducted for its potential contributions to therapeutic 
techniques, it is important to avoid such a decrease in positive affect and increase in anxiety. 
However, with regard to reaction rate, it must be borne in mind that both positive and 
negative mental imagery, such as daydreaming or flash-backs respectively, are both more 
absorbing than similar information processed verbally, and may therefore take longer to 
process than verbal information (Holmes et al., 2009). Because of this, the current study will 
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allow participants to engage in the mental imagery conditions for as long as the participant 
desires, thereby ensuring that the reaction rates to emotionally valenced stimuli are only 
measured once the participant had completed the imagery condition.  
 
So far, it has been shown that mental imagery results in faster recognition of emotionally 
valenced stimuli when compared to verbal processing. A further factor which may influence 
how mental imagery affects reaction rate is the personality of the person engaging in the 
imagery. For example, fMRI studies have indicated that participants differ in the degree of 
vividness which their mental images have, as indexed by differences in neuronal activation 
(McDougall & Pfeifer, 2012). Not many studies have been done on how personality 
differences affect mental imagery, yet those which have been carried out have yielded some 
interesting findings. For example, some studies suggest that introverted people may be more 
sensitive to mental imagery than more extroverted participants, although the results of such 
studies are inconclusive. Conversely, other studies have shown that extroverts subjectively 
report more vivid images than introverts, although this may be due to introverts being less 
impulsive in their reports of vividness (McDougall & Pfeifer, 2012). In other words, if the 
mental imagery must occur simultaneously with other tasks which involve visual suppression, 
then the mental images will be less vivid, and may have less of an effect on other cognitive 
processes than if the images were vivid. However, as this study presents no conflicting tasks 
during the imagery conditions, it can be assumed that the mental imagery will be rich, as 
there are no suppressing variables.  
 
Mental imagery, and consequently the reaction rate to mental imagery, is also affected by the 
concreteness of a word. A concrete word may be defined as any word that is representative of 
an object that can be perceived through other modalities, such as touch and sight. If the word 
being presented is not observable through other modalities, then it is considered to be an 
abstract word. An interesting finding shows that the concreteness of the word being imagined 
has an effect on how information is retrieved from memory (McDougall & Pfeifer, 2012). 
Concrete words which can easily be visualised, such as “door”, have been found to be 
processed faster than abstract words, such as “pride”, which are not associated with one 
particular object or image. Consistent with such findings, imaging studies have shown that, 
whilst there is some neuronal overlap, concrete and abstract words are each processed by 
distinct systems (Binder, Westbury, McKiernan, Possing, & Medler, 2005). According to 
dual coding theory, there are two ways in which memories can be coded or represented. The 
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first representation semantically organises verbally associated words. The second system, 
which is linked to the first system by referential connections, creates representations of 
nonverbal and perceptual experiences, and codes these as images (Paivio, 1991). Thus, if a 
person is presented with a concrete word, the word will first trigger the activation of a verbal 
representation, and then will activate an imagery representation of the word via the referential 
connections to the second system. If, on the other hand, the word which is presented to the 
person is an abstract word, then the word will primarily only activate the verbal 
representation of the word, as imaginal representations are far less robust. McDougall and 
Pfeifer (2012) have used this theory to explain that as concrete words have stronger imaginal 
representations, they are processed faster than abstract words. It must, however, be noted that 
this concreteness effect disappears when concrete and abstract words are presented in 
sentences or are otherwise contextualised. In an attempt at resolving this short-coming, 
context availability theory was proposed. According to this theory, concrete words are 
processed faster as they have a greater store of relevant world knowledge in several 
modalities. Conversely, abstract words have fewer connections to relevant contextual 
knowledge, resulting in reduced access to semantic information, and thus take longer to 
process (McDougall & Pfeifer, 2012). Nevertheless, regardless of which theory is adopted, as 
this study only presents isolated words, it can be assumed that the concreteness effect, and by 
extension both the dual coding theory and context availability theory, are still applicable to 
the current research. It has also been found that ambiguous words have fewer contextual 
associations, and therefore take longer to process than unambiguous words (McDougall & 
Pfeifer, 2012). As all words used in this study are unambiguous, however, it can be assumed 
that this has no ramifications for the current study.  
 
To conclude this section, past research supports the notion that mental imagery results in 
faster reaction rates to stimuli than if the same stimuli are presented verbally. Conversely, the 
studies explored in the previous section established that reaction rates are biased in favour of 
emotionally valenced stimuli relative to non-valenced stimuli. This leads to the central 
question of the current research: namely, what is the effect of mental imagery on the reaction 
rate to emotionally valenced stimuli?  
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2.3 The effects of mental imagery on reaction rates to emotionally valenced stimuli 
 
Whilst there is a plethora of research which has been conducted in each of the fields of 
mental imagery, reaction rates, and the emotional valence of stimuli, there is very little 
research which has been done on the intersection of the three aforementioned fields. As CBM 
is still a very new field, many of the factors which influence the formation and modification 
of cognitive biases have as yet not been explored. Indeed, addressing this absence of 
information is one of the primary contributions of the current study. To wit, there have been 
no studies on how mental imagery affects a person’s reaction rate to emotionally valenced 
stimuli, or how this could be used to modify cognitive biases. 
 
Nevertheless, there is some research that has built a foundation on which to base research on 
the effects of mental imagery on the reaction rate to emotionally valenced stimuli. As stated 
in Chapter 1, one of the aims of this study is to help provide a framework on which a new 
therapeutic method aimed at the non-clinical population could be based. In other words, this 
study aims to explore whether CBM could be coupled with mental imagery to elicit or 
enhance positive affect in a non-clinical population, possibly as a preventative measure. As is 
stated by Levens and Gotlib (2012), having an optimistic outlook on life is linked to adaptive 
psychological adjustment, whilst pessimism may lead to psychological maladjustment. 
Previous research has indicated that attention and information processing has an effect on the 
optimism of a person. This therefore suggests that the early stages of the processing of an 
emotionally valenced stimulus are vital in influencing whether that stimulus will be assigned 
a positive or negative meaning. In other words, being pessimistic or optimistic may influence 
how information is updated in working memory, thereby affecting the association formed 
between the stimulus, and the information evoked by the stimulus (Levens & Gotlib, 2012). 
 
When performing tasks, the content being held in working memory changes. New input gets 
combined with previously stored material, and both types of information are typically 
manipulated. For example, if a person were asked to perform a mental calculation, then 
working memory would be necessary not only to keep the given numbers in mind, but these 
numbers would also have to be manipulated in order to establish what the answer is. Working 
memory also updates, referring to the process through which currently represented and 
previously stored information is modified to accommodate new information (Levens & 
Gotlib, 2010). How emotionally valenced information is processed in the working memory is 
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an elaborate process, typically involving the activation of the long-term memory store 
combined with updates of new inputs. The duration of the activation is also important, as 
representations which are active for longer receive increased processing resources when 
compared to representations which are less active (Levens & Gotlib, 2010). So-called 
maladaptive rumination occurs when elaboration of negative content being held in the 
working memory is not reduced, and which may play a part in the formation of depression. In 
this case, the depressed person is slower at disengaging from negative information, which 
results in lengthier activation of the negative material, which in turn leads to more elaborate 
processing and increased cognitive resources being dedicated to the maintenance of the 
negative information, at the expense of positive information. The opposite of this is adaptive 
mood repair, in which positive material is activated and elaborated in working memory, 
whilst updating negative information to be more positive (Levens & Gotlib, 2010). It is 
exactly this maladaptive rumination and adaptive mood repair which are to be induced 
respectively by the negative and positive mental imagery conditions of this study. 
 
 
2.4 Critical assessment of past research 
 
Having considered previous research conducted in and around the fields of CBM and mental 
imagery, as well as how these findings contribute to the current research questions, it is now 
important to reflect on the weaknesses of past research. When viewing this past research in its 
totality, two main critiques present themselves: the subjective, self-reported measures often 
relied on, and the generalizability of the samples used. Both of these critiques will now be 
further examined.   
 
 
2.4.1 Self-report data 
The first major critique of past research in the field of CBM concerns the nature of the results 
gathered. Despite the important potential contributions which CBM has to offer, only a 
limited amount of research on CBM has been published (MacLeod et al., 2009). Considering 
that CBM is still a relatively new field, such a limited amount of research is understandable. 
However, of these relatively few publications, the majority of the studies employ subjective 
measures using emotionally ambiguous stimuli. Due to this use of ambiguous words, the 
results of these studies are not necessarily generalisable to a larger population, as ambiguous 
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words may have different emotional valence for different people (Hoppitt et al., 2010). 
However, whilst such findings are important in furthering the understanding of how a person 
interprets an emotionally ambiguous stimulus, this has nevertheless restricted the potential of 
the field. For example, although biases are prevalent in many emotional disorders, the exact 
mechanisms of how such biases influence the maintenance of the disorder varies from one 
disorder to another (Lang et al., 2012). Thus, whilst subjective measures may show that 
biases differ from one disorder to another, such findings are nevertheless limiting as they do 
little to inform models of how such disorders may arise. Thus, clearly lacking in the field of 
CBM are studies based on objective methods of quantifying the effect of bias modification on 
how stimuli are perceived. 
 
 
2.4.2 Clinical populations 
The second major critique of much of the current research in CBM concerns the population 
from which the research samples are drawn. The greater part of CBM studies has been 
conducted using a clinical sample, and whilst this does much to further the understanding of 
emotional disorders, these results lack generalizability. In other words, findings from studies 
which used a clinical sample are applicable only to other populations which share the same 
features as the sample group. Whilst such findings may do much to improve the 
understanding and treatment of clinical disorders, a lack of normative research still represents 
a limitation of the potential scope of CBM research.  To illustrate this point, normative 
research in the field of CBM could result in increased quality of life in a normative or non-
clinical population, or could be used in dealing with non-clinical negative affect, or could be 
used in establishing measures aimed at identifying those individuals who are at risk of 
developing an emotional disorder, but who do not as yet meet all the necessary criteria for 
such a diagnosis. Such normative research may even play a role in the development of 
preventative therapeutic interventions aimed at individuals at risk of developing an emotional 
disorder. Thus, to fully take advantage of all the potential and possibilities of CBM research, 
it is important to go beyond studying clinical samples. 
 
In addition to this, most of the research done in CBM has focused either on an attentional bias 
found in anxiety disorders, or on a negative interpretation bias found in depression (MacLeod 
et al., 2009). Such previous studies have been able to show that threat-related attentional 
retraining has been successful in reducing anxiety in people (Bar-Haim, 2010). However, 
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what these studies have failed to demonstrate is whether this reduction in anxiety only occurs 
in response to threatening stimuli, or whether the control process which is induced is relevant 
to a wider range of stimuli. In other words, CBM research has focused on the effects of 
negative biases in clinical populations, with little research being conducted on the effects of 
positive biases, be it in clinical or non-clinical populations. 
 
There is a further disadvantage of using samples drawn from clinical samples; namely, the 
validity of such results may be questioned. The results drawn from clinical samples may not 
necessarily be completely valid, as such studies often do not control for confounding factors 
which may have played a significant role in obtaining such results (Browning et al., 2010). 
For example, if a participant suffering from depression goes through a bad phase at the time 
of measurement, a greater negative bias will be observed. However, this bias would be due to 
the depression rather than the effect of the attentional retraining task. Thus studies which 
were conducted using clinical samples yield results which are not entirely valid and which are 
not generalizable to either the general population, or even to clinical populations with 
different disorders from those in the sample. Therefore, the contributions of much of the 
existing CBM research are limited, resulting in the need for more objective research 
conducted on non-clinical populations. 
 
 
2.5 Implications for the current study 
 
Given that the use of clinical sample groups and the use of self-report measures have limited 
the potential findings of a large proportion of previous CBM studies, the current study is 
designed in part to address these weaknesses. The current research will therefore draw its 
results from a non-clinical sample using an objective instrument which is specifically 
designed to address the research question under study. The implications of this are now more 
fully explored. 
 
 
 2.5.1 Objective report 
The current study will take a step towards addressing the dearth of objective research. As 
indicated above, many of the studies done in the field of CBM use subjective self-report 
measurements, and are of indeterminate validity as results may be due to demand effects 
rather than to the intervention (MacLeod et al., 2009). In addition to this, of those studies 
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which do use a more objective measure, some did not utilise customised assessment 
procedures which were directly relevant to the symptomatology being studied: these studies 
instead employ measures which were not perfectly suited to the topic being considered 
(MacLeod et al., 2009). This study therefore addresses these limitations by using an objective 
measure to accurately gauge the effects of mental imagery. Furthermore, rather than taking an 
existing measure and trying to build the rest of the study around that measure, this study will 
utilise an assessment instrument which is specifically designed to best test the hypotheses 
directly and accurately, thereby ensuring that the instrument is completely pertinent to the 
research questions being addressed. 
 
 
 2.5.2 Normative population 
The second methodological weakness of many CBM studies concerns the use of clinical 
samples. As this study uses a non-clinical sample, the results of this study are more externally 
valid than those of previous studies, and may be generalised to a much wider population. This 
is an important contribution to the field of CBM, as claims of causality cannot be inferred 
when using a clinical population due to the possible confounding factors inherent in such a 
population. Thus, the results of this study will provide findings which are more generalizable 
to the wider population than previous research done using clinical samples.  
 
In response to the fact that most CBM research to date has focused on negative cognitive 
biases, the current study is designed to also study positive biases, as these may be of potential 
therapeutic benefit. Thus, this study is unique in that it focuses not only on negative attention 
biases, but also on positive attention biases and how these affect processing speeds, and 
therefore reaction rates. Put another way, this study does not emphasise dysfunction, but 
rather aims to uncover how dysfunction may arise as well as looking at how normal function 
can be optimised. 
 
Finally, before going on to examine the method underlying this study, the theoretical 
assumptions underlying the study will be explored, and the specific research questions being 
addressed will be detailed.  
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2.6 Overview of the theoretical assumptions made 
 
As has previously been mentioned, this study makes some core assumptions about cognitive 
architecture and about how people interact with the world around them. The purpose of this 
section is to set out these premises clearly.  
 
One of the main premises of this study concerns how people interact with their environment. 
This premise assumes that a person’s expectation of a situation makes that person more likely 
to interpret the situation accordingly. For example, a neutral event such as going to a place 
for the first time may be influenced by one’s expectations. Thus, if a person hears that the 
people in a particular town are unfriendly, that person may go to this town for the first time 
with the expectation of meeting unfriendly people, and may rate the townspeople as being 
more unfriendly than the person would have otherwise rated the friendliness of the townsfolk. 
In other words, a person’s expectations may result in the person seeking out evidence to 
confirm their expectations whilst ignoring any evidence that goes against their expectations. 
In the context of the current study, this would mean that by altering what a person expects 
from a particular situation, one would be able to alter how the person perceives the situation. 
This assumption underlies the main hypothesis of the study, namely that by invoking a 
cognitive bias, one alters the way that emotionally valenced stimuli are perceived and 
responded to. This assumption is supported by previous clinical studies which have shown 
that people suffering from emotional disorders, such as depression and anxiety disorders, 
have thinking styles heavily influenced by cognitive biases, such as negative interpretation 
biases (Holmes et al., 2009). 
 
A second assumption made in this study is that mental imagery results in a cognitive bias 
which is manifested by an increase in the rate at which participants react to emotionally 
valenced stimuli. In other words, it is assumed that a cognitive bias will lead to faster 
processing of certain stimuli. However, many studies have shown that emotionally valenced 
stimuli are attended to preferentially, and therefore processed faster, especially when 
competing stimuli are not emotionally valenced (Calvo et al., 2003; Lang & Bradley, 2009).  
 
A further key assumption which is made in this study, and which was briefly touched on in 
Section 1.5 of Chapter 1, is that processing resources are finite and therefore limited. As 
previously mentioned, this premise is based on the information processing paradigm, a theory 
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which inherently assumes cognitive resources to be limited (Hertwig & Todd, 2003). 
According to this system, the two key limitations on cognitive processes are storage capacity 
and the capacity of information processing, and it is further hypothesised that these 
limitations present a burden which constricts cognitive potential. The terms cognitive 
resources and processing resources are used interchangeably in the context of this study, and 
are taken to refer to the means through which external stimuli are interpreted internally by a 
person. Thus, cognitive resources include processes such as item detection, attention, 
evaluation, and response selection all of which influence the rate at which the stimulus is 
responded to. When claiming that these resources are limited, it is assumed that the amount 
of information which a person is able to compute is inherently limited by the cognitive 
resources of that person. This in turn results in the assumption of sharing (Barrouillet & 
Camos, 2007). Thus, for example, attention is seen to be a limited resource which must be 
shared between the various stimuli (Barrouillet & Camos, 2007). Therefore, an increase in 
attention to one stimulus necessarily results in a decrease in attention to the other stimuli. Put 
differently, a benefit to one stimulus results in a cost to another. Thus, an increase in 
processing resources to emotionally valenced stimuli will result in processing costs to non-
valenced stimuli, resulting in faster processing of the valenced stimuli, and normal or even 
impaired processing of the non-valenced stimuli. These assumptions are found in many 
models of cognitive psychology (Barrouillet & Camos, 2007), and are reasonable 
assumptions to make in the context of the current study. 
 
As can be seen, all the assumptions made in this study are not only feasible, but are also 
either frequently found in many models currently informing contemporary psychological 
knowledge or have been supported by previous studies (Barrouillet & Camos, 2007). Thus, 
the use of these base assumptions in no way undermines the findings of this research. 
 
 
2.7 Research questions addressed 
 
The purpose of this section is to explicitly lay out the research questions being explored in the 
current study. There are two secondary questions and one primary question which will be 
addressed: the main aim of this study being to establish whether engaging in mental imagery 
affects reaction rate to emotionally valenced stimuli, whilst the secondary aims are to 
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examine what effects age has on reaction rates, and to explore whether there are any gender-
related effects on reaction rates to the various scenarios. 
 
 
2.7.1 Research Question 1: Age-related differences 
As was discussed in Section 2.1, the effects of ageing in several cognitive domains can be 
seen through a speed-accuracy trade-off in which older adults are slower but more accurate 
than younger adults (Starns & Ratcliff, 2010). However, it is unclear whether this same trade-
off would be observed in reaction rates to emotionally valenced and non-valenced stimuli. 
Thus one of the secondary objectives of this study is to clarify this point with the research 
question being: Are there any significant age-related differences in reaction rates across the 
various conditions? The hypothesis underlying this aim is based on this speed-accuracy trade-
off model, and proposes that older adults will have significantly slower response rates to the 
various types of stimuli when compared with younger adults. 
 
 
2.7.2 Research Question 2: Gender-related differences 
A further secondary aim of this study is to see whether there are any observable and 
significant differences in the reaction rates and accuracy between male and female 
participants. As was pointed out in Section 2.1, gender-related differences in terms the 
processing of emotional content have not been thoroughly researched. However, Lithari et al., 
(2010) do report that gender differences exist both in how men and women process emotions 
and in how they react to emotions. Thus a secondary aim of this study is to explore whether 
such differences can be found in the reaction rate to emotionally valenced stimuli, as this may 
contribute to our understanding of gender-related differences in emotional processing in 
general. The research question here would therefore be: Are there any significant gender-
related differences in reaction time across the various conditions? The hypothesis in this 
section is non-directional, and merely states that there will be significant differences between 
male and female participants in their reaction rates to the various types of stimuli.   
 
 
2.7.3 Research Question 3: Effect of mental imagery on reaction rates  
The primary aim of this study is to explore the link between mental imagery and to examine 
whether mental imagery could influence the processing rate of stimuli. This will be done by 
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examining how various mental imagery scenarios affect the rate at which emotionally 
valenced stimuli are reacted to. To this end, the research question being explored here is: Do 
positive, negative, and neutral mental imagery have an effect on reaction rates to positive, 
negative, and neutral stimuli? It is hypothesised that engaging in positive mental imagery 
would result in a person being quicker at responding to positive stimuli. Vice versa, negative 
mental imagery would bias a person to react to negative stimuli faster than to either positive 
or emotionally neutral stimuli.  
 
More explicitly, the hypotheses underlying this primary aim propose that engaging in 
negative mental imagery will bias a person towards negative stimuli, and that this bias will be 
demonstrated by an increase in the speed at which participants responded to negative stimuli 
relative to positive or neutral stimuli. Similarly, it is further hypothesised that engaging in 
positive mental imagery will result in a bias towards positively valenced stimuli, which again 
will result in participants being faster to react to positive stimuli than to neutral or negative 
stimuli. In the control condition, the hypothesis maintains that neutral imagery will not bias 
response rates to any particular type of stimulus, resulting in similar response rates to all three 
types of stimuli.  
 
Accordingly, in order to address the questions raised earlier and to fill in some of the gaps in 
previous research, this study attempts to experimentally induce a temporary bias toward both 
positive and negative situations, and to objectively measure the impact of such a bias on 
sensitivity to positive and negative stimuli respectively through the use of a specifically 
designed measure. The next chapter will focus on how the study was carried out. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
 
The previous chapter explored the research contexts from which the questions of the current 
research were drawn. Chapter 2 also included an exploration of previous research and the 
weaknesses of some previous research methods.  The current chapter specifies how the 
current study was conducted, with descriptions of the sample and the measurement 
instrument employed. Data analysis procedures are also described and justified. 
 
 
3.1 Research design 
 
The purpose of this study was to establish whether mental imagery could be used to create a 
cognitive bias which would result in changes in reaction rate to emotionally valenced stimuli. 
This study therefore used a quantitative approach as cognitive biases are not as readily 
observable from a more qualitative point of view, due to their often subconscious nature. 
Therefore, a computer program (described more fully in Section 3.3) was written to measure 
the reaction rates of the participants to emotionally valenced and neutral words under both a 
control condition and under two experimental conditions (please see Appendices 1 to 3 for a 
list of the stimuli used). Accordingly, there were two categorical variables. The first of these 
was mental imagery with three levels, namely positive mental imagery, negative mental 
imagery, and neutral mental imagery, whilst the dependent variable was reaction time. As 
reaction time is a continuous variable, this was measured on a ratio scale. In this case, 
reaction time was objectively measured in milliseconds through the use of a computer 
program. The computer program measured how long the participants took to respond to each 
of the stimuli in each of the conditions, and exported this data to a spreadsheet for later 
analysis. This reaction time was measured in the two experimental positive and negative 
mental imagery scenarios, and in the neutral mental imagery scenario, which acted as the 
control condition (please see Appendix 4 for the scenarios used). Each scenario was 
separately introduced, and participants were asked to respond to 15 emotionally valenced 
stimuli which were presented after each scenario. Of these 15 words, five were positively 
valenced, five were negatively valenced, and five were neutral; this stimulus valence was the 
second categorical variable, also having three levels, namely positive, negative, and neutral 
valence, thereby giving the study a factorial 3x3 design.  
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3.2 Sample selection 
 
As this study aimed to achieve a normative understanding of how mental imagery influences 
reaction rates, care was taken to ensure that a wide range of participants was used so that the 
results of this study would be as generalizable as possible. To this end, participants were 
selected from different age groups and different social economic status groups in order to 
have as varied a population pool as possible. However, there were certain selection criteria 
which needed to be fulfilled before a person could be considered eligible to take part. As this 
study dealt with emotions, and as children may not have developed sufficient cues in 
response to emotionally valenced stimuli, only adults were asked to participate. In the case of 
this study, an adult was taken to be any person over the age of 18. Potential participants were 
also screened to ensure that no participants with psychological and/or cognitive disorders 
took part in the study, as this would have undermined the validity of the study. In other 
words, a disorder may have acted as a confounding variable by giving the participant an 
inherent bias which was not induced by any of the experimental conditions. In addition to 
this, people who have never used a computer before were also not included in the study, as 
computer literacy could also have been a confounding variable and could have affected the 
results. People who do not have a firm grasp of the English language were also not asked to 
participate, as delays caused by difficulties in understanding the meaning of a stimulus would 
have nullified the validity of that person’s reaction rates. In the case of this study, English 
fluency was established via interaction between the researcher and the potential participant. 
Thus, the sampling frame from which the research group was drawn consisted of English 
speaking computer literate adults who have no history of mental, emotional, or neurological 
problems. Even with the presence of these selection criteria, the target population was large. 
Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the data collection procedure, a snowballing effect was 
utilised whereby existing participants were asked for a referral to other people who may have 
been interested in taking part in the study.  
 
As this sample frame excludes a proportion of the general South African population, 
probability sampling and systematic sampling procedures were not applicable in this study. 
Furthermore, as the sample frame was not divided into sub-groups, stratified sampling 
procedures were also moot. Due to this, this study employed non-probability sampling; more 
specifically, a purposive sampling procedure was used. In other words, the participants used 
in this study were selected because their inherent features and characteristics were best suited 
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to the purpose of the study.  This purposive sampling procedure, whilst not as generalizable 
as random sampling procedures, is particularly relevant to experimental studies such as this 
one, as this ensures that the sample is archetypal and normative (Terre Blanche, Durrheim, & 
Painter, 2006). In other words, the sample ought to be highly representative of the larger 
population. Thus, the participants in this study were selected based on availability, 
willingness to take part in the study, and conformity to the selection criteria listed above. 
 
 
3.3 Research instrument  
 
As the hypotheses to be tested in this study required the use of mental imagery, the study 
used three scenarios with imagery instructions designed to make the participant actively 
become involved with the mental image (see Appendix 4 for the three scenarios used). 
Previous studies have found such imagery instructions to be successful in promoting 
participants to engage in mental imagery (Holmes et al., 2009). Each research participant was 
first asked to imagine a neutral situation which did not evoke negative or positive emotions. 
This prepared scenario was presented on the screen for the participant to read through in his 
or her own time, allowing him or her to fully imagine the scenario. Once the participant was 
ready, he or she was then presented with 15 single word stimuli, presented on the screen 
individually, to which the participant had to respond by categorising the stimulus word as 
“positive”, “negative”, or “neutral”. Reaction times to each stimulus were then recorded. The 
hypothesis underlying this first scenario was that as the imagery was neutral, there would be 
no bias towards either positive or negative stimuli. Any bias observed in this section would 
therefore have been caused by a pre-existing bias. Thus, this first section of the study acted as 
a control to ensure that there were no pre-existing biases which could influence the results, as 
well as acting as a base-line against which the reaction times in the experimental conditions 
could be compared. The participants were then asked to read through and imagine a positive 
situation which was described using positively charged words. After this, the reaction times 
of the participant toward a different selection of positive, negative, and neutral stimuli were 
measured. This time, the hypothesis was that positive mental imagery would bias the 
participant towards positive stimuli, resulting in shorter reaction times to positive stimuli 
relative to the negative and neutral stimuli. In the third section of the experiment, the 
participant was asked to read through and imagine a negative situation which was described 
using words which have negative connotations. This was followed by the presentation of a 
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new set of neutral and valenced stimuli to which the participant was asked to respond. Both 
of the experimental conditions and the control condition had a very similar length to ensure 
that the amount of mental imagery engaged in in each of the conditions was approximately 
the same. Also, care was taken to ensure that none of the words used in the imagery 
conditions was repeated as a stimulus word and vice versa. It was hypothesised that the 
negative mental imagery would bias the participant to negative stimuli, and that the 
participant would therefore respond faster to negative stimuli than to positive or neutral ones. 
A vivid description of the various scenarios was used to encourage the participant to 
experience partial aspects of the emotions being conveyed, which thus promoted the 
participant to make inferences about how they would feel in such a situation (Niedenthal et 
al., 2009). 
 
The stimuli used in this study were drawn from the Affective Norms for English Words 
(ANEW) list (Bradley & Lang, 2010). The ANEW list consists of a large number of common 
English words which have been examined to determine the normative emotional ratings of 
each word. Thus, each of the entries contains, amongst other things, information about the 
valence of the word, and about the amount of arousal generated by the word. Whilst this list 
is based on American norms, it is still applicable to the English-speaking South African 
population as only those participants fluent in English were selected for the study. The 
ANEW presents word valence on a scale of 1 to 9, with 1 being very negative and 9 being 
very positive. 45 words were selected in total, with 15 positive words, 15 negative words, and 
15 neutral words. Negative words were defined as any word with a valence rating of less than 
4.00 on the ANEW list, whilst positive words were deemed to be those words with a valence 
rating greater than 6.00, with neutral words being those words with a rating between  4.00 
and 6.00. (See Appendices 1 to 3 for a list of words used, along with their valence and 
arousal scores.) The stimuli were selected from the “All Subjects” category, meaning that the 
arousal and valence scores were calculated based on data collected from both male and 
female participants. This was done to make the computer program usable and relevant for 
both male and female participants, thereby allowing for the collection of sufficient data for a 
comparison on reaction rate between the two genders. Had a computer program been 
specifically written for each gender, then differences in stimuli used would have resulted in 
difficulties in accurately drawing inferences about gender differences. Further to the selection 
of the stimuli, all words used in this study were unambiguous, with the boundaries said to be 
narrow (Starns & Ratcliff, 2010). Put another way, as decisions about the categorisation of 
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the stimuli in this study were small, these decisions could be made quickly, despite the risk of 
decreased accuracy inherent in increased speed. This was important in ensuring that there 
would be no advantages of some words relative to others in terms of the processing power 
required, thereby ensuring that age-related differences could be contributed solely to age 
differences. 
 
As this research design necessitated the recording of reaction times, a computer program was 
written to accurately time each participant’s response. The programming language used was 
C#, due to its simple and general-purpose nature, and the compiler used was Microsoft Visual 
Studio 2010 Professional. All the stimuli words were compiled into a .CSV file, named 
words.CSV. Once the program loads, it reads this .CSV file into a two-dimensional array. The 
array had to be arranged as two dimensional as it stored two Strings in each index. The first 
String was for the stimulus being used, whilst the second String contained the correct 
categorisation of the stimulus, allowing the answer given by the participant to be compared to 
the answer contained in the second String. In order to time the response rate, the Stopwatch 
object was used. Thus, once the stimulus was displayed on the screen, the Stopwatch began 
timing, and this timing was immediately paused when the participant clicked on their chosen 
answer. The program then determined whether the answer was correct and exported the 
stimulus word, the selected category, the correct category, and the reaction time to a separate 
.CSV file. After this, the program randomly chose the next stimulus from the words.CSV file, 
upon which the Stopwatch reset and started timing the response again. This was repeated 
until all stimuli in the words.CSV file had been selected and timed. 
 
From the point of view of the participant, the program first displayed the neutral mental 
imagery scenario, followed by 15 stimuli (five positive ones, five neutral ones, and five 
negative ones, presented in a random order). The program presented one stimulus at a time on 
the screen, and participants were asked to categorise the stimuli by clicking one of three 
buttons presented on the screen (“positive”, “negative”, or “neutral” buttons). Thus, the 
participant’s reaction time was taken to be the amount of time, measured in milliseconds, 
which elapsed between the presentation of the stimuli on the screen and the time at which the 
participant pressed a button. The program automatically recorded the time taken, and 
exported this data to a spreadsheet so that the information obtained could be analysed further. 
Furthermore, although 15 words were presented after each scenario, with five of the 15 words 
being positively valenced, another five being negatively valenced, and the other five words 
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being neutral, the order of these 15 words was random, thereby avoiding any confounding 
effects due to word order. Put another way, although the 15 words consisted of an equal 
distribution of the three types of stimuli, the exact stimuli selected from each type of stimuli 
varied with each run of the computer program. This ensured that the order in which the 
stimuli were presented had absolutely no influence on the reaction rates. 
 
 
3.4 Data collection procedure 
 
Data were collected from the sample population until 80 usable sets of data were gathered, 
with 40 sets from males, and 40 sets from females, thereby also providing ample data for the 
exploration of gender differences. This sample size was large enough to make inferences of 
generalizability, and is comparable to the sample sizes used in other CBM studies (Hoppitt et 
al., 2010). Simultaneously, this sample size was also large enough to ensure the validity and 
reliability of the research. A variety of data was collected from each participant, including 
demographic information and reaction rates. In other words, the computer program recorded 
the age and gender of each participant, as well as the reaction rates to valenced stimuli, 
measured in milliseconds. Additionally, the program also recorded the particular order of the 
stimuli with which each participant was presented, as well as whether the participant 
correctly categorised each stimulus as “positive”, “negative”, or “neutral”. This was done so 
that accuracy rates could also be examined. To ensure that the data collected were free from 
any interference, they were collected in quiet locations and at times convenient to the 
participants so as to avoid any distractors which may influence the results. Furthermore, all 
instructions were coded into the computer program to ensure that no instruction bias affected 
the results. Also,  one half of the data sets were collected during morning sessions and the 
other half of the data sets were collected in afternoon sessions, both for the convenience of 
the participants, and to ensure that there would be no time-of-day effects on the reaction 
rates.  
 
 
3.5 Validity and reliability considerations 
 
In terms of the validity of this measurement procedure, response time was automatically 
measured, resulting in highly accurate results. Furthermore, the inclusion of three situations 
(namely the positive, negative, and neutral) ensured the internal validity of the study. As is 
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stated by Terre Blanche et al. (2006), the internal validity of research can be considered to be 
strong if the results are not readily explainable by rival hypotheses, but are actually caused by 
the intervention itself. As the inclusion of a control eliminated the primary confounding 
variable of pre-existing biases, any observable biases were likely to be caused by the mental 
imagery, and thus the internal validity of this study is greatly strengthened. Furthermore, the 
external validity of this study was also relatively high as the sample was drawn from the 
educated, South African urban population, and is therefore representative of and 
generalizable to the similar populations of other developed countries. As this study relied on 
a computer program to time response rates, the findings are highly reliable. In other words, 
the results which this study yielded are reproducible both on an individual level, and on the 
level of the study itself (Terre Blanche et al., 2006). However, some secondary validity 
concerns may arise, which shall now be addressed. 
 
As the validity of the measurement technique can be undermined if the emotional valence of 
stimuli is incorrect, care was taken to ensure that the positive, negative, and neutral stimuli 
used in the study were really experienced by the participants as being positive, negative, and 
neutral respectively. Great care was taken in choosing stimuli which were either extremely 
negative or extremely positive; in other words, stimuli which left no room for ambiguity. As 
mentioned before, this was done by selecting stimuli from the ANEW list based on the 
ratings of the valence of each word, thereby indicating that the American sample on which 
the list was based experienced the stimuli as either very negative or very positive. However, 
it must be borne in mind that these scores merely represent an average; it is possible that 
some people may have negative associations to positive stimuli or vice versa. For example, 
whilst “Christmas” is a positive stimulus for the general population, it would be perceived as 
negative for a person who lost loved ones over the Christmas period. This interaction 
between the valence of the stimulus and a person’s own experiences with that stimulus 
presented a confounding variable. This confounding variable is, however, an exception to the 
norm, and therefore could not have been controlled for unless the relationships between the 
stimuli used and each participant’s experiences were to have been explored. However, other 
research studies using words as stimuli has done this, and has tailored the list of words used 
to each person. This was done by asking the participant to rate the valence of a long list of 
words prior to the retraining, and then selecting the words rated most strongly in the actual 
training (Bar-Haim, 2010). As such research was conducted on a clinical population, the 
sample sizes were small enough to make such efforts practicable. However, this technique 
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was clearly not feasible for this study due to the much larger sample size. Additionally, as the 
sample in this study was drawn from a non-clinical population, the participants would most 
likely not have had a unique interpretation of a general stimulus. Furthermore, due to the size 
of the sample, an in-depth interview to establish idiosyncratic valence would have been too 
time-consuming, and an exploration of stimulus-experience inter-relationships would also 
have been beyond the scope of the present study. However, because of this possible 
confounding variable, the content validity of the measure may not have been as high as 
possible. 
 
The content validity was, however, increased by the selection of biologically valenced 
stimuli, regardless of whether the stimulus was concrete or abstract. Thus, the positive and 
negative stimuli used were of a biological nature; as protecting one’s wellbeing is instinctual, 
it can be assumed that a biologically threatening or rewarding stimulus will mean the same to 
almost everyone in a non-clinical population. According to Sakaki et al. (2012), emotionally 
valenced stimuli may be either of a biological or social nature. For example, the word 
“bomb” is a biological stimulus as it is directly relevant to a person’s survival, whilst 
“Christmas” receives its valence from a social context. However, how these two types of 
stimuli affect cognitive processes may not be the same: biological stimuli are processed 
automatically, whilst socially relevant stimuli undergo more elaborative processing. In order 
to avoid differences in reaction rate being caused by differences in cognitive processing, all 
stimuli were chosen for their biological valence. Furthermore, biologically valenced stimuli 
have a clear and direct association with a particular outcome (Sakaki et al., 2012), and are 
therefore less ambiguous than socially valenced stimuli, which are often context dependent. 
Moreover, recent studies indicate that biologically valenced stimuli are processed equally 
fast, regardless of whether the stimulus is positive or negative, or whether or not the stimulus 
is expressed as an abstract concept (Sakaki et al., 2012). This is important, as it ensures that 
there was no bias towards the faster processing of negative or positive stimuli. 
 
A further threat to the validity of the research was the computer literacy of participants. In 
other words, some potential participants may not have known how to properly use a 
computer, which would have affected their reaction rate to the stimuli. To avoid this, in 
addition to having drawn the sample from a computer literate population, the computer 
program also incorporated a few practice stimuli. This was done to ensure that all participants 
understood the exact requirements of the computer program and how the program functions 
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before any reaction rate measurements took place. Thus, the effect of computer literacy on 
reaction rate was minimised, and the measurement validity was increased. 
 
Another factor which could have influenced the reaction rates was how the “positive”, 
“negative”, and “neutral” buttons were arranged. For example, if they had been placed too far 
apart, valuable time would have been lost whilst moving the mouse cursor to the relevant 
button. If the buttons had been placed in a list format, then the button at the bottom would 
have taken longer to reach than the button at the top, thereby increasing the time it would 
have taken to press the bottom button. Therefore, the buttons were placed close together 
horizontally with the neutral “neutral” button in the middle of the “positive” and “negative” 
buttons, thereby equalising the distance which the mouse cursor had to move between the 
positive and negative buttons, ensuring that neither was biased in terms of how far the 
participant needed to move the mouse cursor. 
 
To sum up these reliability and validity considerations, the main uncontrolled for threat to 
validity is the effect of atypical experiences of a particular stimulus leading to that stimulus 
being attributed with a different subjective valence when compared to the general population. 
However, such an effect is unlikely given the stimuli chosen and the population from which 
the sample was drawn. All other threats to the validity and reliability of the measure have 
been controlled for in one way or another. Consequently, this measure can be said to have 
reasonably high validity and high reliability, thereby justifying the use of this measure to 
address the research question. 
 
 
3.6 Data analysis procedure 
 
Once the raw data had been collected and collated, a series of descriptive and inferential 
statistical procedures were conducted on the raw data. This was done in order to identify any 
trends in the data, as well as to establish the strength of those trends. To begin with, the 
descriptive statistics used will be examined, before going on to look at the inferential 
statistical techniques, and the reasons for their use. This statistical analysis was done using 
Microsoft Excel 2010 Professional, with the Analysis ToolPak add-in activated. 
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3.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
First of all, the average valence and arousal scores of the positive, negative, and neutral 
stimuli used in the study were calculated, as this was vital in verifying that the stimuli used in 
the computer program were actually relevant in gathering data to address the research 
question. Also central to the topic of the relevancy of the stimuli was the number of incorrect 
categorisations made. For this, the norms drawn from the ANEW list were seen as the 
“correct” evaluation of the valence. Therefore, if participants categorised a stimulus into any 
category other than the “correct” categorisation according to the ANEW list, this 
categorisation was considered to be “incorrect”. For example, according to the ANEW list, 
“paralysis” has a valence of 1.98 (Bradley & Lang, 2010). As this valence is extremely low, it 
designates the valence of the stimulus as being negative. Thus, if a participant were to 
categorise “paralysis” as being positive or neutral, then this categorisation would deviate 
from the category designated to the stimulus based on the ANEW valences, and this would 
therefore be considered to be an “incorrect” categorisation. This distinction between correct 
and incorrect was made so that it would not only be possible to obtain data on the accuracy of 
the response rates in the current study, but also so that inferences could be made regarding 
the degree to which there was intercultural agreement about the valence of the stimuli 
involved. Put another way, if there were only a small number of so-called incorrect 
categorisations, then that would be an indication that the South African sample tested in the 
current study awarded the stimuli with similar valence values as the American samples used 
to create the norms in the ANEW list. This in turn would demonstrate a high degree of 
intercultural agreement on the valence of the stimuli. 
 
Having looked at the descriptive statistics of the stimuli used in this study, the descriptive 
statistics pertaining to the demographics of the participants were reported. This included 
calculating the age range, mean age, the standard deviation of the ages of the participants, as 
well as the distribution of male and female participants over the various ages. These were 
calculated in order to gain a better understanding of the sample population. Furthermore, the 
ages of the participants were divided into six distinct age groups in order to facilitate later 
analyses of how reaction rates changed as a function of age. 
 
Following on from these statistics, the average reaction rates of the participants to the various 
stimuli were examined. The average reaction rates to each of the stimuli and under each of 
the three different types of scenarios were presented.  Subsequently, the descriptive statistics 
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pertaining to the age-related reaction rates were examined. More precisely, the average 
reaction rates for each age group were collated and divided up into the three separate 
scenarios, with each scenario containing the average reaction rates to each of the three types 
of stimuli for each age group. Graphic representations of results were also created where 
relevant to aid in the visual representation of interesting trends in the data. The Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients were also calculated for each of the scenarios. This was done in order 
to verify the strength of the relationship between age and average reaction rate in each of the 
scenarios. Also pertinent to the effects of age on reaction rate was the number of incorrect 
categorisations made per age group. The descriptive statistics for this were also provided, and 
focused on the average age per age group, the number of participants per age group, and the 
average number of incorrect categorisations per age group. The Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient value was also calculated in order to establish the strength of the relationship 
between age and the number of incorrect categorisations made. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients were used in these instances as they provided information about the strength of 
the relationship between two variables. The resulting r-values can range from 1 to -1, with 
values closer to 1 indicating a strong positive correlation, and values closer to -1 signifying 
that the variables have a strong negative correlation. Conversely, values of around 0 indicate 
that there is no correlation between the two variables (Terre Blanche et al., 2006). Practical 
significance was also taken into account to ensure that any significant results were indeed 
substantial.  
 
Finally, the descriptive statistics pertinent to the gender differences were explored. As one of 
the secondary aims of this study was to examine the differences in reaction rate between male 
and female participants, it was essential to first inspect the demographics of the two genders 
before going on to calculate the inferential statistics relevant to gender differences. This last 
part of the descriptive statistics section contained information about the age range, average 
age, standard deviation of the age data, and the total and average number of incorrect 
categorisations made by the two genders. In addition to this, reaction rate data were also 
correlated by gender, resulting in the average reaction rates for males versus females for all 
three types of stimuli and under all three types of mental imagery conditions. This was done 
in order to facilitate an elementary overview of the gender differences in average reaction rate 
before the statistic validity of these results was calculated using inferential statistical 
procedures.  
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3.6.2 Inferential statistics 
In addition to the descriptive statistics, inferential statistics were also used to test the 
hypotheses which were being studied in the current research in order to determine that the 
observed trends were significant. Two types of inferential statistics were utilised. The first of 
these was a factorial ANOVA used to test the main hypotheses underlying this research (as 
laid out in Section 2.7.3). The second statistical technique on the other hand, was a t-test used 
to ensure that any gender differences observed in the descriptive section of the results were 
significant, and therefore of relevance to the current study (see the hypothesis set out in 
Section 2.7.2). Although this could have been analysed using a three-way ANOVA looking at 
the factors of gender, stimulus valence, and imagery type, this statistical function is not 
supported by the software used for data analysis (Microsoft Excel 2010 Professional), thereby 
necessitating the use of multiple t-tests.  
 
As there were three levels of the two categorical variables, a factorial ANOVA was used in 
the interpretation of the raw data. This was done in order to determine whether there were 
any significant differences in reaction times under the various imagery and valence 
conditions, or whether the observed results were obtained by chance. A factorial ANOVA 
was used as this allowed for the analysis of both main effects and interaction effects. In other 
words, a factorial ANOVA was used as it not only indicated the degree to which the 
conditions affected reaction rates, as well as to what extent the valence of the stimuli had an 
effect on the reaction rates, but this type of ANOVA was also able to provide information on 
the interaction between mental imagery and the valence of the stimuli. ANOVAs are a useful 
statistical analysis method in studies such as this one as they ensure that intergroup variation 
of means is significant when compared to random sampling variation (Terre Blanche et al., 
2006); in other words, ANOVAs safeguard that the results obtained are not observed by 
chance, but are the observed indicator of an effect. Thus, this method of analysis was suitable 
for the data obtained, and was also sufficient for addressing the research question which was 
explored in the current study. As the study called for only a single ANOVA comparison, the 
Type 1 error (which is an increased likelihood of the false rejection of the correct null 
hypothesis) was not likely. In addition to this, as the sample size of this study was fairly 
large, there was no increase in the risk of a Type 2 error (meaning that an incorrect null 
hypothesis has less chance of being rejected). As a result of these power considerations, a p-
value of 0.05 was considered to be an acceptable level of significance for this study. Indeed, 
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an A priori power analysis done using G*Power (version 3.1.9.2) using an alpha error 
probability rate of 0.05 and an effect size of 0.5 (considered to be large) yielded an actual 
power value of 0.96 and a required total sample size of 39, thereby indicating that the power 
considerations of this design were satisfactory. This ANOVA was therefore used to show 
whether the reaction rate to valenced stimuli was significantly affected by mental imagery, or 
whether the observed results could be explained by probability and observed through chance. 
In order to determine whether any statistically significant results found in the ANOVA 
analysis were truly significant, a Fisher’s Least Significant Difference post hoc test was 
performed to increase the confidence in the obtained results by minimising the likelihood of 
false positives. 
 
In addition to the factorial ANOVA, separate two-sample t-tests were performed on the mean 
reaction rates for men versus women for each of the three conditions to discover whether 
there were any gender differences in sensitivity to mental imagery. As mentioned before, it 
was not possible to do a three-way ANOVA in Microsoft Excel, thereby necessitating the use 
of multiple t-tests. Accordingly, the raw data was divided into reaction rates to neutral 
stimuli, reaction rates to positive stimuli, and reaction rates to negative stimuli in each of the 
three conditions for male participants versus the reaction rates for female participants. In all 
of the conditions, the hypothesis being tested was that there was a gender-related difference 
in reaction rates (see hypothesis outlined in Section 2.7.2). Thus, the null hypothesis for each 
of the conditions stated that there would be no gender-related differences in reaction rates. A 
p-value of 0.05 was set as the significance level for these three t-tests, as such a p-value is 
low enough to ensure that results are significant, but not so low that there is a risk of 
incorrectly accepting the null hypothesis. In addition, as each t-test was performed on a 
separate set of data, there was no increase in the risk of Type 1 error. The use of these nine 
two-sample t-tests served to illustrate whether there were any real and significant gender 
differences in reaction rates. Due to the use of multiple comparisons, there is an increase in 
the risk of cumulative error, thereby indicating that a Bonferroni correction ought to be used. 
Although the power considerations of this study were sufficient to avoid using a Bonferroni 
correction, this correction was nevertheless applied in order to increase the strength of the 
results. Whilst this did not directly contribute to the primary research question, these results 
were important in addressing one of the secondary aims of this study, namely to further the 
understanding of gender differences, which in turn may help to explain why and how gender 
differences in various emotional disorders exist. 
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3.7 Summary  
 
To summarise, the main aim of the current research was to establish whether mental imagery 
could be used to create a cognitive bias which results in the faster reaction rate to emotionally 
valenced stimuli. To this end, a computer program was designed to first measure reaction 
rates to positive, negative, and neutral stimuli under a control condition which used neutral 
imagery. This was done in order to establish a base-line of reaction rates as well as to 
determine whether any of the participants had any pre-existing cognitive biases. After this 
control condition, the program then went on to measure the reaction rates of the participants 
to positive, negative, and neutral stimuli under two experimental conditions, namely after the 
use of positive mental imagery, and after engaging in negative mental imagery. The raw data 
in the form of response rates measured in milliseconds were then subjected to various 
descriptive and inferential statistical procedures in order to extrapolate relevant results. These 
results will now be presented in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, various statistical procedures were performed on the 
raw data obtained from the computer program. The methods of analysis which were used, 
why these were used, and the results they yielded shall be considered in this chapter. The 
results are presented in different sections: first are the descriptive statistics, as these are useful 
in obtaining an overview of the data, thereby providing an impression of any trends in the 
data. Following the section containing the descriptive statistics are the inferential statistics, 
which were used to test the hypotheses underlying this study, and to point out the significance 
of the results obtained. 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
This section of the results shall first focus on examining the stimuli used in this study as well 
as how many incorrect categorisations were made, followed by an inspection of the 
demographics of the participants. Once this has been done, the average reaction rates will be 
reported. Whilst these results contribute to an overall picture of the trends in the data, it is 
also necessary to look at more specific questions, such as how these reaction rates interact 
with factors such as age and gender. Thus, the results pertaining to age and gender-related 
trends constitute the final portion of this section.  
 
 
4.1.1 Stimuli applicability 
Before examining the results obtained from the computer program, it is important to first 
consider the actual stimuli used in the data collection procedure. After all, had the program 
contained poorly suited or irrelevant stimuli, then any results obtained from such stimuli 
would be equally unsuitable for addressing the research question.  In other words, it was 
necessary to examine the applicability of the stimuli used in the study. This was done by 
examining the valence and arousal scores of the stimuli to ensure that these stimuli were 
suited to the various stimuli categories. Table 4.1 shows the average valence and arousal 
scores for each of the three types of stimuli used: positive, negative, and neutral. 
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Table 4.1: ANEW Average valence and arousal scores of the stimuli used 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the stimuli used in the current study were drawn from the ANEW 
list of frequently used English words, as this allowed the valence and the arousal of the words 
to be taken into account. Arousal values were expressed on a scale, with 1 being minimally 
arousing and 9 being extremely arousing. Valence scores were expressed on a similar scale, 
with 1 being very negatively valenced, 9 being very positively valenced, and scores around 5 
being seen as neutral, with both the valence and the arousal scores being obtained from the 
ANEW list (Bradley & Lang, 2010). As can be seen from Table 4.1, the average valence of 
negative words was extremely low, receiving an average score of 1.71 out of a possible 9, 
indicating that these stimuli had a very negative valence. The average arousal for the negative 
stimuli was 5.93, representing a moderately high amount of arousal. The positive stimuli on 
the other hand had a similar albeit slightly higher arousal, with an average arousal score of 
6.36. The valence of the positive stimuli was very high, with an average rating of 8.30 out of 
a possible 9, signifying that the positive stimuli had a highly positive valence. Conversely, 
the neutral stimuli only had an average valence score of 5.01. As valence was rated on a scale 
from 1 to 9, a score of 5 represents the exact middle of the continuum, meaning that these 
stimuli are neither positive nor negative, but wholly neutral. The average arousal of these 
neutral stimuli was low, having an average score of 3.63, indicating that these stimuli had a 
far lower ability to excite and capture participants’ attention. 
 
What is interesting to note is that both positive and negative stimuli have an average valence 
score which is approximately 0.70 away from the two extremes of the continuum. In other 
words, as the continuum is rated on a scale from 1 to 9, 1 represents the negative extreme, 
whilst a score of 9 represents the positive extreme. The average negative stimuli rating was 
situated 0.71 from the negative extreme of the continuum, with a rating of 1.71. Equally, the 
average positive stimuli’s rating fell at 8.30, exactly 0.70 away from the positive extreme of 
the valence continuum. From this, it can be concluded that the valence of the positive and 
negative stimuli was equivalent, albeit situated on opposite sides of the continuum. The 
arousal and valence scores for each of the three types of stimuli could therefore be considered 
 Average Valence Score Average Arousal Score 
Positive Stimuli 8.30 6.36 
Negative Stimuli 1.71 5.93 
Neutral Stimuli 5.01 3.63 
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appropriate for addressing the research question, thereby ensuring that any results obtained 
through the use of these stimuli were relevant to the research question under examination. 
 
Having established that the stimuli used in the study were indeed applicable and relevant to 
the study, it is now important to consider other descriptive statistics pertinent to the stimuli. 
As the valence and arousal scores of the ANEW list were calculated using an American 
sample, it is also vital to consider whether these scores are equally applicable to a South 
African population. However, as the participants in this study were not directly asked to rate 
the valence and arousal of the stimuli included in the study, it was necessary to indirectly 
infer whether the South African sample deviated from the American norm by examining the 
degree to which the two samples agreed on the valence of the stimuli. In other words, if the 
South African sample did not diverge from the American sample, then the South African 
sample would have categorised all negatively valenced ANEW words as being negative, all 
positive ANEW words as positive, and all neutral ANEW words as neutral. Thus, a 
comparison of the accuracy of the South African sample based on the American standards 
contained in the ANEW list was used as an indication of the homogeneity of the two different 
samples. For the sake of this study, the valence category listed in the ANEW list was seen as 
the “correct” category, and any divergence from this was seen as an “incorrect” 
categorisation, despite the fact that cross-cultural variations in the understanding of a 
stimulus cannot be deemed as correct or incorrect.  Figures 4.1 through to 4.3 therefore 
illustrate the number of discrepancies per condition for each of the three types of stimuli. 
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Figure 4.1: Number of incorrect categorisations of neutral stimuli 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the number of discrepancies between how the participants in this study 
categorised the neutral stimuli and how the stimuli ought to have been categorised according 
to the norms presented in the ANEW list, as well as under which mental imagery condition or 
scenario this categorical discrepancy occurred. In other words, the performance of the South 
African sample on the categorisation of neutral words in each of the three conditions in the 
experiment was compared to the valence allocated to the stimulus in the ANEW list. As each 
stimulus was presented once to each participant, and as there were 80 participants, each 
stimulus was therefore repeated a total of 80 times in this study, resulting in a possible total 
of 80 incorrect categorisations. As the order in which the stimuli were presented in the 
program was randomised, each word had the possibility of occurring after the neutral imagery 
scenario, after the positive mental imagery scenario, or after the negative mental imagery 
scenario. The results in the above graph indicate how often each neutral stimulus was 
incorrectly categorised, as well as after which scenario the incorrect categorisation was made.  
Thus, as can be seen in Figure 4.1, the stimulus words “contents” and “paper” were each only 
incorrectly categorised once, after the positive mental imagery scenario and the negative 
mental imagery scenario respectively. “Rain”, on the other hand, was incorrectly categorised 
a total of 25 times: 11 times when it occurred after the neutral scenario, nine times after the 
positive scenario, and only five times after the negative scenario. What is interesting to note 
is that each neutral stimulus was incorrectly categorised at least once. In other words, there 
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was no instance in which the categories allocated by the South African sample coincided 
completely with the valence scores on the ANEW list obtained from an American sample. In 
total, neutral stimuli were incorrectly categorised as either being positive or negative a total 
of 96 times. Of these 96 incorrect categorisations, 38 instances occurred after the neutral 
scenario, and the remaining 58 instances were evenly distributed between the positive and the 
negative mental imagery scenarios, with each scenario being followed by 29 incorrect 
categorisations. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Number of incorrect categorisations of positive stimuli 
 
The total number of incorrect categorisations of positive stimuli was also 96, the same as for 
neutral stimuli. As can be seen in the above graph, the only stimulus which was correctly 
categorised as being positive in all instances was “joy”. The most incorrectly categorised 
stimulus on the other hand, was “cash”, which was incorrectly categorised a total of 23 times: 
ten times following the neutral imagery scenario, six times after the positive mental imagery, 
and seven times after participants read the negative scenario. Overall, participants incorrectly 
categorised positive stimuli as either being neutral or negative 28 times after the neutral 
imagery condition and 20 times after the positive mental imagery condition. However, once 
participants had read the negative mental imagery scenario, the number of incorrect 
categorisations under this condition rose to 48. In other words, after the negative mental 
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imagery condition, participants made as many incorrect categorisations as in the previous two 
scenarios combined.  
 
Figure 4.3: Number of incorrect categorisations of negative stimuli 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.3, there were far fewer incorrect categorisations of negative 
stimuli. In total, only 29 of such incorrect categorisations occurred, as compared to the 96 
incorrect categorisations for each of the positive and neutral stimuli. Furthermore, both 
“agony” and “infection” were allocated the correct category in all 80 instances in which these 
two stimuli occurred. The most frequently incorrectly categorised negative stimulus was 
“suicide”, with three incorrect categorisations in the neutral scenario, and one incorrect 
categorisation in each of the positive and the negative scenarios. 
 
To summarise the results concerning the stimuli used in this study according to the data 
contained in the ANEW list, the stimuli used in this study were relevant to the question under 
examination. However, the statistics for the accuracy of the categorisation of the stimuli 
suggested that there was a degree of discrepancy between American norms and the valence 
allocated to the same stimuli by a South African sample. 
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4.1.2 Participant demographics 
Having examined the pertinence of the stimuli used not only to this study, but also to a South 
African sample, it is time to analyse the statistics relevant to the sample used in this study.  
 
An overall total of 81 participants completed the computer program. However, one set of data 
was not included in the analysis due to a response set bias which would have decreased the 
validity of the responses. Thus, a total of 80 sets of data were used, with 40 participants being 
male and 40 participants being female. The demographics of the sample used in this study are 
presented in Table 4.2.  
 
 Ages 18-
19 
Ages 20-
29 
Ages 30-
39 
Ages 40-
49 
Ages 50-
59 
Ages 60-
69 
Total 
n 3 47 14 12 1 3 80 
n Female 1 23 9 6 0 1 40 
n Male 2 24 5 6 1 2 40 
Average age 18 25 33 44 52 63 30.5 
Table 4.2: Demographic data of participants 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.2, there was a total of 80 participants in the current study. They 
were evenly distributed between the two genders, with a total of 40 female participants and a 
total of 40 male participants. As the majority of the participants were clustered in the lower 
age groups, the age distribution was positively skewed. This positive skewing in age 
distribution was also observed in the distribution of the genders, with greater numbers of 
males and females being clustered in the lower age groups.  
 
The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 64 years, with a mean age of 30.5, and a 
standard deviation of 10.4. In order to analyse the data for age-related effects, the participants 
were divided into six age groups, namely from 18 to 19, 20 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, 50 to 59, 
and 60 to 69. As can be seen in Table 4.2, each age group contained a similar number of male 
and female participants, with the exception of ages 30 to 39, which contained almost twice as 
many females as it did males. The other exception is the 50 to 59 age group, which contained 
a single male participant, and no female participants. What is also interesting to note is that, 
with the exception of the first two age groups, the average age of each age group was less 
56 
 
than the median of each age group, thereby indicating that, on average, participants were 
clustered in the lower end of each age group, meaning that the distances between the average 
age per age group was fairly equal. 
 
Having established that the stimuli used in this study were relevant to the study, and having 
examined the demographics of the participants of this study, it is time to look at the average 
reaction rates with which the participants responded to the various types of stimuli. 
 
 
4.1.3 Average reaction rates 
Table 4.3 presents the average reaction rates which were obtained by the participants in the 
control condition as well as in the two experimental conditions. These results were obtained 
by calculating the averages from all the relevant raw data using the appropriate Excel 
function. As was described in Chapter 3, Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 Professional was used 
to compile the program through which the reaction rates were obtained. Thus the confidence 
in the accuracy of the reaction rates, and therefore of the averages presented below, is high.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: ANOVA of reaction rates in each condition in milliseconds 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.4, reaction rates in the control condition, or neutral mental 
imagery condition, are all fairly similar, with participants being fastest at recognising 
positively valenced stimuli, with an average rate of 1514ms. The response rate to neutral 
stimuli was marginally slower, with participants taking an average of 13ms longer to respond 
to neutral stimuli as compared to positive stimuli. In the neutral scenario, participants took 
longest to respond to the negatively valenced stimuli, with the average reaction rate in this 
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case being 1553ms, resulting in an overall difference of 39ms between the fastest average 
reaction rate (positively valenced stimuli) and the slowest average reaction rate (negatively 
valenced stimuli). These findings appeared to be consistent with the hypothesis underlying 
this condition, namely that response rates to positive, negative, and neutral stimuli would not 
differ greatly (see Section 2.7.3 for hypothesis formulation). However, as these statistics were 
purely descriptive, the significance of this trend was not calculated. Therefore, rather than 
being taken as conclusive support for the hypothesis, the claim made here was that these 
descriptive results were consistent with those expected on the basis of the hypothesis, but that 
inferential analysis would be necessary in order for the support of the hypothesis to be clear.  
 
After participants were exposed to positive mental imagery in the first experimental 
condition, average reaction rates were different from those in the control condition. Average 
response rates for neutral stimuli constituted the slowest response rates in this condition, with 
an average rate of 1507ms. This was similar to those found in the control condition, being 
only 20ms faster than the average reaction rate to neutral stimuli in the neutral scenario. The 
average reaction rate of participants toward positively valenced stimuli was the fastest, with 
an average of only 1413ms. In other words, in this experimental condition, participants on 
average were able to respond to positive stimuli 94ms faster than to neutral stimuli. 
Negatively valenced stimuli, on the other hand, were responded to at an average of 1482ms 
following the positive mental imagery condition. This average was 69ms slower than the 
average response rate to positively valenced stimuli. The hypotheses being tested in this 
condition stated that engaging in positive mental imagery would not affect the reaction rate to 
neutral stimuli, but would result in faster response rates to positively valenced stimuli as well 
as slower response rates to negatively valenced stimuli (see Section 2.7.3). The results 
presented in Figure 4.4 appeared to be consistent with these hypotheses. However, although 
these results seem to show conformity with the hypotheses, further inferential statistical 
analysis was necessary before this could be seen as unequivocal support of the hypotheses. 
 
The second experimental condition exposed participants to negative mental imagery before 
measuring their response rates to neutral, positively valenced, and negatively valenced 
stimuli. In this condition, the slowest average response rate was to positively valenced 
stimuli, with an average response rate of 1492ms. This was 20ms slower than the average 
reaction rate to neutral stimuli, which was 1472ms. Participants on average responded much 
faster to negatively valenced stimuli, with the average reaction rate in this case being 
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1408ms. The hypotheses underlying this experimental condition were that engaging in 
negative mental imagery would not affect reaction rates to neutral stimuli, but would lead to a 
faster response to negatively valenced stimuli and a slower response to positively valenced 
stimuli (see Section 2.7.3). The average reaction rates in this case indicated that response 
rates to positively and negatively valenced stimuli were as expected. However, the results 
also showed that negative mental imagery did seem to affect response rates to neutral stimuli 
as well, a trend which was not hypothesised.  
 
Figure 4.4 clearly shows that the overall fastest average reaction rate was the reaction rate of 
participants to negatively valenced stimuli after having been exposed to negative mental 
imagery, with an average reaction time of 1408ms. Conversely, the slowest overall reaction 
time occurred when participants were responding to negative mental imagery in the neutral or 
control scenario, with the average reaction rate being 1553ms.  
 
 
 4.1.4 Age-related reaction rates 
One of the secondary aims of this study was also to examine whether age has any effect on 
the reaction rate to emotionally valenced stimuli (see hypothesis in Section 2.7.1). Figures 4.5 
through to 4.7 illustrate the differences in average reaction rate between the various age 
groups under the neutral imagery condition, the positive mental imagery condition, and the 
negative mental imagery condition respectively. (See Appendix 5 for numerical values) 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Age-related differences in reaction rate after neutral mental imagery  
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Figure 4.5 illustrates the different average reaction times obtained by each age group in the 
neutral imagery condition. As can be seen, reaction rate was fastest for the 18 to19 year old 
reacting to negative stimuli, with an average rate of 1272ms, with the slowest reaction rate of 
2372ms being for the 60 to 69 age group reacting to neutral stimuli. However, the overall 
trend suggests that, with a few exceptions, the reaction rate of the participants increased as 
the age of the participants increased, indicating a positive correlation between age and the 
reaction rate of participants in response to neutral mental imagery. This trend was seen in 
response to neutral stimuli, and positively and negatively valenced stimuli, with the trend 
being most uniform in response to positive stimuli. A Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
investigating the interaction between the average age per age group and the average reaction 
time per age group to all stimuli in the neutral imagery condition resulted in an r=.799. As 
this coefficient ranges from 1 to -1, the closer the value is to either 1 or -1, the stronger the 
correlation between the two factors. Thus, a value of r=.799 indicates that there is a strong 
positive correlation between age and reaction rate in the neutral imagery condition. In other 
words, the older the participants were, the longer they took to respond to the stimuli in the 
neutral imagery condition. The coefficient of determination (r
2
) was also calculated in order 
to determine how much of the variance in the first variable is explainable by the second 
variable, and this yielded a value of r
2
=.638, indicating that a large portion of the variation 
found in the neutral imagery condition is as a result of age differences. 
 
Such a strong trend was, however, not present after the participants had engaged in positive 
mental imagery. Figure 4.6characterises the average reaction rates of the various age groups 
to neutral, positive, and negative stimuli after the participants engaged in positive mental 
imagery.  
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Figure 4.6: Age-related differences in reaction rate after positive mental imagery  
 
After participants engaged in positive mental imagery, the fastest average response rate of 
1110ms was obtained by the 18 to 19 age group, and the slowest average response was 
2034ms, scored by the 60 to 69 year olds, replicating the findings from the neutral imagery 
condition. However, in this case, the fastest reaction rate was in response to positive stimuli, 
unlike in the neutral scenario, where the fastest average reaction rate was in response to 
negative stimuli. On the other hand, in both the positive imagery scenario and in the neutral 
imagery scenario, the overall slowest average response rate was scored by the 60 to 69 age 
group in response to neutral stimuli. As opposed to the neutral imagery condition, the age 
differences in average reaction rate in the positive mental imagery condition did not show any 
particularly clear trends. There was a slight increase in reaction rate as the age of the 
participants increased, although this tendency was not as pronounced as it was in the neutral 
imagery condition. In order to directly measure the correlation between age and response rate 
in the positive imagery condition, a Pearson’s correlation coefficient was calculated, with 
r=.664, indicating that there was a strong correlation between the two factors, although not as 
strong as the correlation between age and reaction rate in the neutral mental imagery 
condition. A coefficient of determination value of r
2
=.441 was observed, indicating that the 
age variable accounted for a reasonably large amount of the variation reaction times in this 
condition, even though this effect was smaller than that found in the neutral condition. 
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This correlation between the average rate at which participants responded to the neutral, 
positive, and negative stimuli was slightly stronger after participants had been exposed to the 
negative mental imagery scenario. These average reaction rates are displayed in Figure 4.7. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Age-related differences in reaction rate after negative mental imagery 
 
As in the preceding two scenarios, the fastest average response rate was scored by the 18 to 
19 age group, whilst the slowest average reaction rate was scored by the 60 to 69 year olds. 
However, in this case, the fastest reaction rate of 1213ms was in response to the neutral 
stimuli, whilst the slowest average reaction time was 1935ms, and was in response to positive 
stimuli. Overall, the average reaction times for each of the age groups, with the exception of 
the 60 to 69 age group, were more uniform after the negative mental imagery scenario than in 
the preceding two scenarios. However, despite being more equally distributed in appearance, 
a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of r=0.728 was obtained. In other words, there was a 
strong positive correlation between age and the average reaction rate in the negative mental 
imagery condition. Whilst this r-value was not as strong as the correlation found in the 
neutral mental imagery condition, it is nevertheless stronger than the correlation obtained in 
the positive mental imagery condition. This was confirmed by a correlation of determination 
analysis, which yielded a value of r
2
=.530, indicating that age affected the variation observed 
here more than it affected the positive condition, but also not as much as it affected the 
neutral imagery condition. 
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Having established that there was a positive correlation between age and the average rate at 
which participants responded to all three types of stimuli, and under all three conditions, it 
was also important to consider how many incorrect categorisations were made by each age 
group. This information is provided in Table 4.3. 
 
 
Ages 18-
19 
Ages 20-
29 
Ages 30-
39 
Ages 40-
49 
Ages 50-
59 
Ages 60-
69 
n 3 47 14 12 1 3 
n Female 1 23 9 6 0 1 
n Male 2 24 5 6 1 2 
Total incorrect 
categorisations 
4 147 30 28 3 9 
Average incorrect 
categorisations 
1.3 3.1 2.1 2.3 3.0 3.0 
Table 4.3: Average number of incorrect categorisations per age group 
 
As can be seen from the above table, the number of participants in each age group varied 
greatly. As stated earlier in this chapter, the participants were primarily clustered in the lower 
age groups, with over half of the participants belonging to the 20 to 29 age cohort. Out of the 
six age groups, only three of them (namely ages 20 to 29, ages 30 to 39, and ages 40 to 49) 
contained over 10 participants per group. Male and female participants were fairly evenly 
distributed over the six groups, with the only exceptions being the 50 to 59 age group which 
only comprised one male participant, and the 30 to 39 age group, in which there were 
considerably more females than males. In terms of the incorrect categorisations, the group 
with the highest number of these was the 20 to 29 age group. Despite having the highest 
number of participants in this age group, the 20 to 29 year olds still had the highest average 
number of incorrect categorisations, although this average was only slightly higher than the 
averages of the 50 to 59 age group and the 60 to 69 age group. Conversely, the cohort 
containing the 18 to 19 year olds had the lowest average number of incorrect categorisations. 
A Pearson’s correlation coefficient of r=.612 was obtained for the correlation between age 
and the average number of incorrect categorisations, thereby indicating a mild correlation. In 
this case, r
2
=.375, indicating that almost 38% of the variance observed is a result of age 
differences.   
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4.1.5 Gender differences 
Before going on to look at the inferential statistics regarding whether or not there were any 
significant gender-related differences in reaction rate (as hypothesised in Section 2.7.2), it 
was essential to first have a look at some descriptive data concerning the male versus female 
participants. These data are represented in Table 4.4. 
 
 Male Female 
n 40 40 
Age Range 18-64 18-61 
Average Age 30.9 30.1 
Age Standard Deviation 11.3 9.6 
Total Number of Incorrect Categorisations 144 77 
Average Number of Incorrect Categorisations 3.6 1.9 
Table 4.4: Demographic information of male versus female participants 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.4, there were 40 male participants and 40 female participants in 
this study. The age of the male participants ranged from 18 to 64 years, with an average of 
30.9 years, and a standard deviation of 11.3. The age of the female participants on the other 
hand, ranged from 18 to 61 years, with an average of 30.1 years, and a standard deviation of 
9.6. What was interesting to notice, however, was that male participants made almost twice as 
many incorrect categorisations than the females did, with males having an average of 3.6 
incorrect categorisations per male participant, and females having an average of only 1.9 
incorrect categorisations per female participant. 
 
In terms of average reaction rates, Table 4.6 indicates the average time in milliseconds (ms) 
which male participants took to respond to the various stimuli under the various conditions in 
comparison to female participants. 
 
 Neutral Scenario Positive Scenario Negative Scenario 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Neutral Stimuli 1633 1421 1559 1468 1557 1402 
Positive Stimuli 1575 1453 1441 1376 1556 1427 
Negative Stimuli 1634 1473 1555 1420 1478 1335 
Table 4.5: Average reaction rate in ms for male versus female participants 
 
Table 4.5 reports the average reaction rates for males versus females in each of the mental 
imagery conditions, and in response to each of the three types of stimuli. As can be seen from 
Table 4.5, male participants took longer to respond to stimuli than the female participants.  
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This trend held true for all of the average reaction rates to all three types of stimuli, and in all 
three conditions.  
 
In the neutral mental imagery condition, males took an average of 212ms longer to respond to 
neutral stimuli than females. However, this difference in reaction rates dropped to an average 
difference of 122ms in response to the positive stimuli, and rose again to an average 
difference of 161ms in response to negative stimuli. Following the positive mental imagery 
scenario however, female participants were only an average of 91ms faster at responding to 
neutral stimuli than were male participants. This difference in response rate dropped even 
lower to an overall average difference of only 65ms in response to positive stimuli. However, 
when it came to responding to negatively valenced stimuli, female participants were 135ms 
faster than were male participants. The differences in average reaction rates increased again 
after participants engaged in the negative imagery scenario. Under this condition, males were 
on average 155ms slower to respond to neutral stimuli than were female participants. This 
figure decreased slightly in response to positive stimuli, with female participants being an 
average of 129ms faster than males. Finally, in response to negatively valenced stimuli, male 
participants took an average of 143ms longer than female participants. 
 
Whilst these results of this section as well as those of the preceding section clearly indicated 
that engaging in either positive or negative mental imagery led to a change in response rate, a 
factorial ANOVA was conducted on the raw data in order to determine whether or not the 
differences in reaction rates were significant or not. This was explored in the next section of 
this chapter. 
 
 
 
4.2 Inferential statistics 
 
The inferential statistics conducted on the data obtained in this study were two-fold. The first 
procedure was a factorial ANOVA, which was carried out in order to determine whether the 
observed results were significant or not. The second procedure used t-tests to examine 
whether there were any significant gender differences in the data. Each of these two 
procedures will now be examined, together with the results obtained through these methods. 
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4.2.1 Factorial ANOVA of reaction rates 
Before going on to look at the results obtained through the ANOVA, it is first necessary to 
establish that the base assumptions underlying ANOVA were not violated in the current data 
set (Fields, 2012). In terms of an ANOVA based on a linear model, there are three main 
assumptions: namely independence of observations, normality of distribution, and 
homoscedasticity. Due to the large size of the target population, it can be assumed that 
independence of observation remains intact, as the observations are unlikely to be affected by 
a common outside influencing factor. Similarly, as this study deals with reaction rates, a 
normal Gaussian distribution can be anticipated, meaning that this assumption also remains 
intact. As for the homogeneity of variance assumption, a Levene’s test could not be run on 
the data due to the limitations of the program used to analyse the statistics. 
 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, a factorial ANOVA analyses the variance in a set 
of data with two or more factors in order to determine whether there were any significant 
differences in reaction times under the various imagery conditions, or whether the observed 
results were obtained by chance. A two-factor analysis with replication was conducted on the 
raw data using Excel, with the two factors being stimulus valence and mental imagery 
condition, with each factor having three levels. The levels of the stimulus valence factor were 
negative valence, positive valence, and neutral valence, whilst the levels of the mental 
imagery factor were positive metal imagery, negative mental imagery, and neutral mental 
imagery (See Appendix 6 for the full ANOVA analysis).  As there were 80 sets of data with 
each set of data containing five positive, five negative, and five neutral stimuli after each 
scenario, each scenario had a total of 400 (80x5) replications. As there were three different 
types of stimuli, this resulted in 1200 (400x3) reaction times per scenario. As stated in the 
Method chapter, p=.05 was set as the significance level, in accordance with the power 
considerations of this study.  
 
Three sets of values were obtained through the use of the factorial ANOVA: one set of values 
for each of the two factors, and the third set of values pertaining to the interaction between 
the two factors. The first set of values was indicative of the significance of the variation 
between the three types of scenarios, namely the neutral scenario, the positive mental 
imagery scenario, and the negative mental imagery scenario. A comparison of the variance 
between these three types of mental imagery yielded F (2,77) =8.406, p=.00023, which was 
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much larger than the critical F value of F-Crit=2.99823, thereby indicating that the null 
hypothesis is not up-held. This was a clear indication that the three types of mental imagery 
had vastly different and significant effects on the rate at which participants reacted to the 
various stimuli. In terms of the effect size, an Eta
2
 value of Ƞ2=0.00463 was obtained, thereby 
showing that the effect is statistically significant, but weak.  These values therefore supported 
the hypothesis that mental imagery would significantly affect the rate at which participants 
would react to stimuli, leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis which stated that mental 
imagery would not result in a significant difference in reaction rates. 
 
The second factor analysed in the factorial ANOVA was the type of stimulus used, with the 
three levels of this factor being neutral stimuli, positively valenced stimuli, and negatively 
valenced stimuli. As the values obtained (F=1.1877, DF=2,77, p=0.3050) were not 
significant, it can safely be assumed that the type of stimulus used had no significant effect. 
These results support the trends referred to in the descriptive statistics section of this chapter: 
namely that when the mental imagery condition was neutral, reaction rates to all three types 
of stimuli were relatively equal. Taken together, these results demonstrated that reaction 
times were not significantly affected by the type of stimulus being responded to.  
 
The third and final set of values obtained through the factorial ANOVA pertained to the 
interaction between the two factors. In other words, these values stood for the significance of 
the interaction between the type of mental imagery scenario and the valence of the stimulus 
being responded to. The ANOVA yielded F (4,75) =3.45758, p=.00794, indicating that there 
is a statistically significant interaction between the type of mental imagery engaged in and the 
valence of the stimuli. As the F-value is larger than the F-Crit, this indicates that the null 
hypothesis ought to be rejected. The effect size, was however quite weak, with an Eta
2
 value 
of just Ƞ2=0.00381 being obtained. 
 
A Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) post hoc test was calculated in order to obtain 
a pairwise comparison. Although it is often argued that the LSD results in inflated type 1 
error rates, this only holds true when comparing more than three means (Seaman, Levin, & 
Serlin, 1991), which is not problematic for this study, as three means are used. Seaman et al. 
(1991) also found that the LSD 8% more powerful than other common post hoc tests, such as 
Tukey’s HSD, which suggests that this post hoc analysis procedure was an appropriate 
analysis tool in the context of the current study. The LSD test was calculated using the 
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formula = t √𝑀𝑆𝐸 (
1
𝑁1
+
1
𝑁2
) , and this yielded  a critical value of 55.77. This critical value 
could then be compared to the differences between group means obtained in the ANOVA 
table (see Appendix 6). If the critical value was larger than the difference in group means, 
then this suggested that the effect observed was indeed significant. The comparisons between 
group means can be found in Appendix 7. According to this post hoc test, there was no 
significant difference in response to any of the stimuli valences after participants engaged in 
neutral mental imagery, as was expected. However, after engaging in positive mental 
imagery, there were significant differences in response to stimulus valence between neutral 
versus positive stimulus valences, and in positive versus negative stimulus valences. 
Similarly, after participants engaged in negative mental imagery, there was a significant 
difference between neutral versus negatively valenced stimuli, as well as a significant 
difference between positively and negatively valenced stimuli (for full values, please see 
Appendix 7). 
 
To sum up the results obtained from the factorial ANOVA, the obtained values clearly 
showed that mental imagery had a very strong effect on the reaction rates of participants to 
the various stimuli. Furthermore, whilst the stimuli themselves had no real effect on the 
reaction rates, the interaction between the type of mental imagery and the emotional valence 
of the stimuli had an effect on the speed at which participants reacted to the various stimuli. 
 
 
4.2.2 Gender-related t-tests 
Table 4.6 shows the mean reaction rates (in ms) by males and females in the various 
conditions. As can be seen from the table, the fastest reaction rate of male participants 
(1440.6 ms) was in response to positive stimuli after engaging in positive imagery. 
Conversely, female participants were fastest in responding to negative stimuli after having 
read through the negative imagery scenario (1335.3 ms). 
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Table 4.6: Mean and Standard Deviation differences between genders in ms 
 
In order to determine whether there were any gender differences in the reaction rates beyond 
those seen in the above descriptive statistics, nine independent t-tests were conducted on the 
scores (see hypothesis in Section 2.7.2). As previously stated, although these data could have 
been analysed using a 3-way ANOVA, this was not possible in the current study due to the 
limitations of the analysis program used. The values of these t-tests are presented in Table 
4.7.  
 
 Neutral Imagery Scenario Positive Imagery Scenario Negative Imagery Scenario 
p t df d p t df d p t df d 
Neutral 
Stimuli 
.0000* 4.25 398 .991 .0710 1.81 398 .409 .0018* 3.14 398 .722 
Positive 
Stimuli 
.0032* 2.96 398 .679 .2004 1.28 398 .288 .0016* 3.18 398 .732 
Negative 
Stimuli 
.0003* 3.62 398 .840 .0019* 3.13 398 .718 .0124 2.51 398 .572 
Table 4.7: t-test and Cohen’s d values comparing gender differences in reaction rates 
 
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the use of multiple comparisons does increase the risk of 
cumulative error, thereby necessitating a Bonferroni Correction. With an alpha value of 0.05 
and a total nine t-tests being performed, this means that the chance of finding significant 
 Neutral Imagery 
Scenario 
Positive Imagery 
Scenario 
Negative Imagery 
Scenario 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 
 
Male 
Neutral 
Stimuli 
1632.9 539.7 1559.0 517.7 1557.2 568.3 
Positive 
Stimuli 
1575.2 475.6 1440.6 497.4 1556.1 445.8 
Negative 
Stimuli 
1633.6 484.3 1554.8 471.2 1477.8 634.1 
 
 
Female 
Neutral 
Stimuli 
1421.0 453.6 1468.0 488.1 1402.2 405.0 
Positive 
Stimuli 
1452.9 338.7 1376.0 509.2 1426.9 361.7 
Negative 
Stimuli 
1472.6 401.7 1420.4 384.3 1335.3 480.6 
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differences in nine tests is 36.98%. Thus, a Bonferroni’s adjustment would lower the alpha 
value to 0.006 (obtained by dividing the original alpha value of 0.05 by the number of 
comparisons, so 0.05/9). Cohen’s d was also calculated for the various tests, as this is an 
indicator of the size of the effect, which is useful in determining how strong the phenomenon 
under study really is. Values in Table 4.7 which comply with the Bonferroni adjustment are 
marked by an asterisk 
 
After participants were exposed to the neutral imagery scenario, Table 4.7 indicates that there 
was a significant difference in how males and females reacted to neutral, positive, and 
negative stimuli. This difference was particularly great in terms of the reaction rate to neutral 
stimuli, with males (M=1632.9, SD=539.7) being slower than females (M=1421.0, 
SD=453.6) t (398) =4.25, p=.00003, and Cohen’s d=.9913. The difference between the two 
genders in their reaction rates to negative stimuli was also highly significant: on average 
males (M=1633.6, SD=484.3) were again slower than females (M=1472.6, SD=401.7), t 
(398) =3.62, p=.00033, and Cohen’s d=.8401. This difference in reaction rates was not as 
pronounced in response to positive stimuli, with females (M=1452.9, SD=338.7) being 
slightly faster than males (M=1575.2, SD=475.6), t (398) =2.96, p=.00323, whilst the 
Cohen’s d value was d=.6795, with DF=39.  
 
After the participants had been exposed to the positive mental imagery scenario, these 
differences in reaction rates between male and female participants diminished. When the 
reaction rates of male (M=1559.0, SD=517.7) versus female (M=1468.0, SD=488.1) 
participants in response to neutral stimuli following the positive mental imagery scenario 
were compared, t (398) =1.81, p=.07104 was observed, indicating that there was no 
significant difference between how male and female participants reacted to the neutral 
stimuli. There was also no significant difference in terms of male (M=1440.6, SD=497.4) and 
female (M=1376.0, SD=509.2) reaction rates to positive stimuli, with t (398) =1.28, 
p=.20042. However, there was a significant difference between how males (M=1554.8, 
SD=471.2) and females (M=1420.4, SD=384.3) responded to negative stimuli after having 
been exposed to positive mental imagery, as is indicated by t (398) =3.13, p=.00190, with 
Cohen’s d being d=.7188. 
 
Once the negative mental imagery scenario had taken place, the differences in reaction rates 
between male and female participants increased again. As in the neutral imagery condition, 
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the differences between males and females in response to all three types of stimuli were 
significant. When comparing the reaction rates of male (M=1557.2, SD=568.3) and female 
(M=1402.2, SD=405.0) participants in response to neutral stimuli, this yielded a value of t 
(398) =3.14, p=.00180. In addition to this, an effect size (Cohen’s d) of d=.7228 was 
obtained, indicating that this difference was very large. The difference in the reaction rates to 
positive stimuli between male (M=1556.1, SD=445.8) and female (M=1426.9, SD=361.7) 
participants was also very large, with t (398) =3.18, p=.00158, and an effect size of d=.7322. 
The difference between the two genders in response to negative stimuli was slightly smaller, 
with males (M=1477.8, SD=634.1) being slower than females (M=1335.3, SD=480.6), t 
(398) = 2.51, p=.01244, and with a Cohen’s d of d=.5723. However, although the effect size 
is still relatively strong, the p-value was just above the adjusted alpha value, indicating that 
this difference was not significant. Thus, although not statistically significant in this study, 
further studies with a larger sample size may find a statistically significant difference. 
 
To summarise, these results suggest that males and females differed significantly in their 
response rates to the various stimuli and under the various imagery conditions. The only 
exceptions to this were the responses to neutral and positive stimuli after the participants had 
engaged in positive mental imagery, as well as to negative stimuli after the negative imagery 
condition. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the stimuli used in this experiment were relevant to 
the study. Furthermore, it was found that engaging in mental imagery does affect the reaction 
rate to emotionally valenced stimuli. However, what was not looked at in this chapter is the 
meaning of the results. Thus, the implications of the results and the inferences which can be 
drawn from them are further considered in the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
Whilst the results observed in this study are unique, they do coincide to some degree with 
results of other studies. This chapter therefore presents a critical appraisal of the results 
obtained in this study, and also compares these results with the findings of past studies. This 
chapter also details both the contributions and possible applications of the findings, as well as 
the limitations of the current study. 
 
 
5.1 Summary of the study 
 
Before going on to look at the various results and their implications, this chapter begins with 
a summary of the previous sections of this study, whose primary aim was to investigate 
whether engaging in positive mental imagery could influence the rate at which participants 
reacted to positive stimuli, and, in a similar vein, whether negative mental imagery could 
cause a difference in the reaction rate to negatively valenced stimuli.  Put concisely, this 
study was primarily aimed at investigating whether different types of mental imagery had an 
effect on the reaction rate with which participants responded to emotionally valenced stimuli. 
Secondary aims of this study included examining the effects of age and gender on these 
reaction times in order to gain a better understanding of how such variables influence the 
interaction between the type of mental imagery and the rate at which a person reacts to 
emotionally valenced stimuli. 
 
The literature review individually explored each of the concepts contained in this study, and 
also focused on the intersections between the various concepts where such information was 
available. However, as pointed out in the literature review, very little information was found 
documenting the interactions between mental imagery and reaction rates to emotionally 
valenced stimuli, thereby further demonstrating the need for a study such as this one. 
 
The study was exploratory in nature, and used a quantitative approach to address the research 
questions. The sample consisted of a total of 40 male participants and 40 female participants 
selected from different age groups and different socio-economic status groups in order to 
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obtain results which were as generalizable as possible. Each participant completed a 
specifically designed computer program in which he or she was asked to respond as fast as 
possible to neutral stimuli, positively valenced stimuli, and negatively valenced stimuli, after 
having engaged in neutral mental imagery, positive mental imagery, and negative mental 
imagery. The primary hypothesis (see 2.7.3 in Chapter 2) stated that engaging in negative 
mental imagery would bias a person towards negative stimuli, as demonstrated by an increase 
in the speed at which participants responded to negative stimuli relative to positive or neutral 
stimuli. Similarly, it was further hypothesised that engaging in positive mental imagery 
would result in a bias towards positively valenced stimuli, which would result in participants 
being faster to react to positive stimuli than to neutral or negative stimuli. In the control 
condition, the hypothesis stated that neutral imagery would not bias response rates to any 
particular type of stimulus, resulting in similar response rates to all three types of stimuli. The 
secondary hypotheses being tested concerned differences in response rates caused by age 
differences and gender differences (formally set out in Sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 in Chapter 2 
respectively). Thus, one secondary hypothesis stated that there would be an age-related 
difference in response rates with younger participants being faster than older participants, 
whilst the other secondary hypothesis stated that gender differences would result in different 
reaction rates for the two genders. 
 
The raw data obtained from the computer program were analysed using various Excel 
formulae. The relevance of the stimuli used in the study as well as their applicability to a 
South African population was examined using descriptive statistics. On the one hand, age-
related effects on reaction rates were explored using both descriptive statistics as well as 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients. On the other hand, however, the gender-related effects on 
reaction rates were explored using both t-tests and Pearson’s correlation coefficients. The 
main hypotheses concerning the effects of mental imagery on the reaction rate to emotionally 
valenced stimuli were verified using a factorial ANOVA. Whilst the results of the analyses 
were presented in the previous chapter, their implications were not fully expounded, and 
these shall be fully explored in the following section. 
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5.2 Discussion of the results 
 
The results obtained in the previous chapter shall now be expanded on in the order in which 
they were presented in the fourth chapter. The implications of the results shall be further 
discussed, and how the present findings fit in with previous research shall also be taken into 
consideration. 
 
 
5.2.1 Stimuli 
The stimuli used in this study were taken from the ANEW list based primarily on the valence 
scores of each word reported in the ANEW list. However, as was mentioned in section 4.1.1 
in Chapter 4, these valence scores were calculated using an American sample. Whilst care 
was taken to select words which are not culture-specific, and which are biologically relevant, 
and which should therefore be relevant to all humans, the amount of incorrect categorisations 
indicated that the stimuli are not completely applicable to a South African sample, which in 
turn could have ramifications for the amount of measurement error obtained in the results. 
However, some inter-cultural variation is expected, and the degree of discrepancy between 
American norms and the valence allocated to the same stimuli by a South African sample is 
not so large as to invalidate the results drawn from the data obtained in this study. 
Additionally, it must be kept in mind that the instructions given in the computer program 
specified that participants should respond to the stimuli as fast as they could. This may have 
skewered the speed-accuracy trade-off so that a greater number of mistakes were made in 
order to increase the speed at which the participants responded to the stimuli. In other words, 
as participants were asked to categorise the stimuli as fast as possible, this may have resulted 
in a heightened number of incorrect categorisations than if the participants had been 
instructed to categorise the stimuli at their own pace. Thus, it is necessary to view those 
stimuli which were incorrectly categorised once or twice as possible mistakes. For example, 
it may have been that stimuli such as “abuse” or “disaster” were incorrectly categorised not 
because one of the participants believed that these stimuli do not belong in the negative 
category, but because a participant may have accidentally pressed the “neutral” or “positive” 
button. However, whilst some incorrect categorisations may be due to error, it is not possible 
to ascribe multiple incidents of an incorrect categorisation of the same stimulus to error. 
Stimuli such as “cash”, “rain”, and “baby” were incorrectly categorised a total of 23, 25, and 
19 times respectively. This suggests that there is a discrepancy between the American valence 
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norms and the valence which the South African sample in this study allocated to these 
stimuli. This in turn illustrates that, whilst the American norms may be helpful in guiding 
hypotheses regarding South African samples, it is nonetheless essential for future research to 
establish valence and arousal norms based on South African samples. However, it is also 
possible that some of these differences in stimulus categorisation may be due to the wants 
and needs of the individual at the time of observation. As discussed in section 4.1.2 in 
Chapter 4, the sample studied in this research was clustered in the younger age groups, with 
over half of the sample being in the 20 to 29 age group.  It may therefore be that concepts 
which were reported as having a positive valence in the ANEW list may change over the 
duration of a person’s lifetime. For example, it is possible that the valence of stimuli such as 
“cash” and “baby” may change with the stage of life in which the individual finds himself or 
herself. Thus, it may be that starting a family and having the financial means to support a 
family may not be as important to a person in the 20 to 29 age group as it is to a person in the 
30 to 39 age group. Consequently, it is possible that a younger age group would classify 
stimuli such as “cash” and “baby” as being neutral, whilst an older age group would be more 
likely to categorise these stimuli as positive, or that females would rate “baby” as being more 
positive than men, due to inherent motherly instincts. It is also possible that cultural 
differences are largely the cause of the discrepancies in the emotional valence allocated to the 
stimuli. For example, as droughts are a very real occurrence in Africa, it could be that “rain” 
was rated as being more positive by the South African participants, as rain is perceived as 
something that enables crops to grow. Similarly, it is possible that other stimuli, such as 
“cash” are rated as less positive due to changes in the way money transactions are made. In 
other words, stimuli such as “cash” may be less relevant in the electronic era than other 
related but more current stimuli, such as “credit card” for instance. 
 
It was interesting to note that positive stimuli and neutral stimuli both had a total of 96 
incorrect categorisations, whilst the stimuli which were negatively valenced were only 
incorrectly categorised 29 times, less than a third as frequently as the positive and neutral 
stimuli. This suggests that there is much greater intercultural agreement on what constitutes a 
negative stimulus, with much greater variability in opinion over whether a positive stimulus 
really is positive, or whether a neutral stimulus is really neutral. According to Robinson, 
Storbeck, Meier, and Kirkeby (2004), when a person is initially encoding a stimulus, and if 
the stimulus is found to be arousing, then the stimulus will automatically be assumed to have 
the potential to be dangerous. If, however, the stimulus is not highly arousing, then it will be 
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assumed to be safe. Thus, the level of the arousal of the stimulus influences whether the 
stimulus can be approached or whether it should be avoided, with moderate levels being 
linked to an approach reaction, and higher levels triggering an avoidance reaction. These 
claims made by Robinson et al. (2004) illustrate that people are more receptive to negative 
stimuli, with the results of the current study indicating not only that people are more sensitive 
to negative stimuli, but also that, in this case at least, there was greater cross-cultural 
agreement as to what constitutes a negative stimulus than what constitutes a positive or a 
negative stimulus. It was, however, interesting to note that “suicide” was the most frequent 
incorrectly categorised negative stimulus. A possible explanation for this draws on the 
conclusions put forward by Robinson et al. (2004), namely that dangerous stimuli are highly 
arousing, triggering avoidance of the stimuli. In the case of “suicide”, it could be that the 
concept of suicide is not seen as negative as it is not a threat to one’s biological integrity per 
se. In other words, suicide is a conscious and pre-meditated decision to end one’s own life, 
and is therefore something a person voluntarily engages in. Other negative and biologically 
relevant stimuli, such as “terrorist”, “abuse”, or “torture”, are possibly more likely perceived 
as a threat as they are caused by an external agent, and are therefore perhaps more likely to be 
rated as being negative. An alternative explanation is that the act of committing suicide is not 
as taboo as it once was, and that this wider acceptance could be an influencing factor on why 
the stimulus “suicide” was the most incorrectly categorised negative stimulus. 
 
 
5.2.2 Participant demographics 
After having analysed the statistics relevant to the stimuli used in the study, the next set of 
results related to participant demographics was examined. The demographics pertaining to 
the participants illustrated that the sampling technique used was effective in collecting data 
from a variety of age groups, and from both genders. However, because fluency in English 
was one of the selection criteria used to choose participants, the participants came from a 
homogenous language group, although there was variation in the cultural groups from which 
the participants were selected. In addition to this, recruiting participants from various socio-
economic status groups ensured that the sample used in this study was highly representative 
of the non-clinical South African adult population. Furthermore, as the sample was drawn 
from different strata in the general population, the external validity of this study was 
relatively high, thereby ensuring that the sample was representative of and generalizable to 
the general population of non-clinical English-speaking adult South Africans (Cozby, 2005). 
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As Cozby (2005) also points out, two advantages of convenience sampling are that 
convenience samples induce smaller costs than randomised sampling procedures, and the 
convenience samples are also faster to obtain. Therefore a convenience sample was used for 
the current study. Nevertheless, it must be noted that this study did violate one of the base 
assumptions of ANOVAs, namely randomisation of participants, so the conclusions drawn 
from these results can only be seen as tentative. 
 
With regard to the sample size used, as this research was explorative in nature, it was not 
necessary to have an overly large sample size. In other words, as the primary aim of this 
study was to test the hypotheses outlined in the first chapter, the sample size needed only to 
be large enough to confirm whether the expected trend would be observed or not. 
Furthermore, as stated by Hoppitt et al., (2010), much of the research done in the field of 
CBM has used small samples, with the sample size used in the current research being 
comparable to the sample sizes used in other CBM studies. Nevertheless, the sample size was 
large enough to yield some idea of how cognitive bias modification affects mental imagery.  
 
Furthermore, the constraints governing the sample selection increased the fittingness of 
participants. This information, combined with the suitability of the stimuli used, indicates that 
both the method through which the raw data were obtained, as well as the sample population 
from which the raw data were drawn were both as valid as possible for addressing the 
hypotheses which were explored in the current study. 
 
 
5.2.3 Average reaction rates 
As care was taken to increase the validity of the method of analysis, it can be inferred that the 
results obtained ought also to be fairly valid. The findings of the current study were to some 
extent consistent with those observed by Kousta et al. (2009), who also found that positively 
and negatively valenced words were recognised faster than neutral words. Whilst Kousta et 
al. (2009) found reaction rates to negatively valenced words to be the fastest at 568ms, 
positively valenced words were slightly slower, with an average reaction rate of 570ms. 
Neutral words were found to be significantly slower, taking an average of 593ms. However, 
it must be kept in mind that these results were found using verbal processing, rather than the 
mental imagery processing used in the current study. The current study found that, overall, 
the average reaction rate to neutral stimuli constituted the slowest response rate, taking an 
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average of 1502ms; this is consistent with the results obtained by Kousta et al. (2009) who 
also found reaction rates slowest to neutral stimuli. However, as opposed to the findings of 
Kousta et al. (2009), the findings of this research indicated that the average reaction rate with 
which participants responded to positively valenced stimuli was actually faster than the 
average rate at which participants responded to negatively valenced stimuli, with average 
rates being 1473ms and 1481ms respectively. Nonetheless, the difference between these two 
average reaction rates is very small, as was also the case in the findings reported by Kousta et 
al. (2009). It must be noted that the large discrepancies between the average reaction rates in 
this study versus the research conducted by Kousta et al. (2009) are due to the nature of the 
tasks: in the Kousta et al. (2009) study, participants were required to judge whether a string of 
letters presented a word or a non-word before pressing a button. However, in the current 
study, participants were required to read each stimulus, to make judgements about the 
valence of the stimuli, to decide whether the stimuli were neutral, positive, or negative, and 
then finally to click the appropriate button. Thus, as the current study involved more steps 
than the Kousta et al. (2009) study, reaction times were slower in the current research. 
 
One of the contributions of this study was to provide evidence in the discrepancies between 
the findings of Kuhbandner et al. (2009), who found that participants were faster at 
recognising negative rather than positive stimuli due to faster bottom-up processing relative 
to top-down processing, and the findings of Hoppitt et al. (2010) who found that the healthy, 
non-clinical population has a slight bias towards perceiving positive stimuli as this helps to 
shield them from negative emotions. As one of the primary reasons for including the neutral 
imagery condition in this study was to act as a control condition aimed at identifying pre-
existing biases, the results from this condition provided some additional information. After 
the neutral imagery scenario, participants reacted to neutral stimuli at an average rate of 
1527ms, whilst the average reaction rate to positive stimuli was 1514ms, and the average 
reaction rate to negative stimuli was 1553ms. In other words, on average, participants were 
slowest at responding to positive stimuli, and fastest at reacting to negative stimuli. These 
findings support those of Kuhbandner et al. (2009), and provide support to their hypothesis 
that bottom-up processing of stimuli results in a faster reaction rate to negative stimuli than to 
positive or neutral stimuli. However, it must be noted that, in the context of the current study, 
the difference in average reaction rate between response time to positive stimuli and response 
time to negative stimuli was only 39ms. Thus, the advantage in processing speed of negative 
stimuli over positive stimuli was very small. As such, the differences between the reaction 
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rates to neutral, positive, and negative stimuli are so small that one can conclude that the 
sample observed in this study did not have any pre-existing biases.  
 
As there were no pre-existing biases found in this study, this contributes to the debate as to 
whether biases cause the emotional state, or whether the emotional state causes the biases 
(Hoppitt et al., 2010). If the first option had been true, namely if biases had caused the 
emotional state, then there would have been greater differences in the reaction rates in the 
neutral mental imagery condition. In other words, as no alteration of emotional state occurred 
in the neutral imagery condition, then any pre-existing biases would have manifested in 
diverging sensitivities to the three different types of stimuli presented after the scenario. The 
absence of such diverging reaction rates indicates that there were no pre-existing biases 
influencing the results. As such, the results of the current research support the second option, 
namely that the emotional state causes the biases. The manipulation of the emotional state of 
the participants through the use of positive and negative mental imagery resulted in 
significant increases in the sensitivity to positive and negative stimuli respectively. From this, 
it is possible to conclude that positive mental imagery biased the participants towards 
responding to positive stimuli, whilst engaging in negative mental imagery created a bias 
towards negative stimuli. The current research therefore goes some way in providing 
empirical evidence in the debate mentioned by Hoppitt et al. (2010), and further illustrates 
that a person’s emotional state can be manipulated in order to induce a bias towards certain 
types of stimuli over others. 
 
 
5.2.4 Age-related reaction rates 
The next question which was addressed was related to how various types of mental imagery 
affect the reaction rate to emotionally valenced stimuli as a function of age (as set out in 
Section 2.7.1 in Chapter 2). In other words, did the reaction rate change as a person got older, 
and if so, how did it change? The analysis of the age-related reaction rates indicated that there 
was a positive correlation between the age of the participants and the rate at which the 
participants responded to the stimuli, meaning that the older a participant was, the longer that 
participant took to respond to the stimuli. The strength of the correlation varied from strong 
in the neutral imagery scenario, to moderate in the positive mental imagery scenario, and 
back to strong in the negative imagery scenario. This indicates that as a person ages, the rate 
at which that person responds to stimuli after engaging in any of the three types of mental 
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imagery increases substantially. It has been well documented that several cognitive 
capabilities decline with increasing age (Cavanaugh & Blanchard-Fields, 2011), and in light 
of this, these findings are not surprising. 
 
The strong correlation observed after the neutral imagery scenario indicates that older adults 
typically respond to stimuli more slowly than do younger adults. This control condition was 
specifically designed to establish whether or not there were any pre-existing biases, with 
results indicating that there were no significant biases prior to the experimental conditions. 
Thus, it can be claimed that in the absence of any cognitive biases, older adults take longer to 
respond to various stimuli than younger adults. Similarly, the strong correlation between age 
and response rate after the negative mental imagery showed that older participants took 
longer to respond to stimuli after the negative imagery scenario than younger participants. 
What was interesting was that the correlation between age and reaction time was less strong 
after the participants had engaged in positive mental imagery. From the results obtained, one 
can see that response rates to various stimuli after engaging in positive mental imagery were 
fairly uniform for the various age groups, with age only having a moderate effect on reaction 
rates. This suggests that age-related differences in reaction rate are affected differently by the 
various types of mental imagery, with less of a difference observed when participants engage 
in positive mental imagery than if they engage in neutral or negative mental imagery. 
 
But this raises the question as to what causes these age-related differences in reaction rate. 
One possibility is that the effects of increased age are linked to the accuracy speed trade-off, 
whereby younger adults are faster at making decisions than older adults, but make more 
mistakes than older adults. The findings in this study partially support the claims of Starns 
and Ratcliff (2010), who state that, on the one hand, older adults typically make more 
accurate decisions than younger adults, but on the other hand, younger adults are faster at 
making decisions than their older counterparts. An analysis of the results based on 
performance levels per age cohort did indeed support the notion that younger adults were 
faster than older ones: the correlation coefficients calculated in section 4.1.4 in the previous 
chapter clearly show that there was a positive correlation between age and the speed with 
which the participants responded to the stimuli. However, Starns and Ratcliff (2010) also 
claim that older adults make more accurate decisions than younger adults, a notion only 
moderately supported by the current findings. More specifically, a look at the average 
number of incorrect categorisations which occurred in the current study indicated that the 
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youngest age group in this study had the lowest average number of incorrect categorisations, 
whilst the two oldest age groups had the second highest number of incorrect categorisations. 
Nevertheless, age and the average number of incorrect categorisations obtained a correlation 
coefficient of r=.612, showing that there is a moderate correlation between the two factors. It 
is possible that the uneven distribution of participants across the six age groups could have 
resulted in a weaker correlation than the expected correlation. In other words, if this study 
had had a larger sample which was more evenly distributed among the various age groups, 
then it is possible that the correlation coefficient observed for the interaction between age and 
the average number of incorrect categorisations would have been stronger, thereby providing 
more support for the statement made by Starns and Ratcliff (2010). 
 
With regard to the question as to how it is that such age-related differences in reaction rate 
exist, Starns and Ratcliff (2010) suggest that differences in the speed at which younger and 
older adults complete decision-based tasks is caused by a difference in the degree of the 
conservativeness which they adopt. In other words, when faced with making a decision, older 
adults typically spend a greater amount of time gathering information about a decision in 
order to make more accurate choices than do younger adults. In the context of the current 
study, this would suggest that the older participants spent more time considering their 
experiential knowledge regarding the stimuli than younger participants. Whilst this did enable 
older participants to make slightly more accurate categorisations, this strategy also put older 
participants at a disadvantage in terms of reaction speed. The findings of the current study 
support the notion that older adults are more conservative in their decisions than younger 
adults, as was indicated by the high correlation between age and average reaction rate, as well 
as the moderate correlation between age and accuracy. 
 
However, an alternative explanation by which these age-related differences can also be 
elucidated is through the variances in speed of processing theory. Cavanaugh and Blanchard-
Fields (2011) state that the speed of processing, namely the speed and the efficiency with 
which early steps in information processing are carried out, is affected by age, with many 
early stages of information processing taking longer as a person gets older. Information about 
the valence of a stimulus is one of the first features which are encoded when processing a 
stimulus, and this information is available in the earliest stages of information processing 
(Robinson et al., 2004). Taken together, this suggests that because the speed at which certain 
early stages of processing are completed is negatively correlated with age, it is possible that 
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the reaction rates of older participants in this study were affected by this decline in the speed 
of processing. In other words, as information about stimuli valence is present in the earliest 
stages of information processing, and as these first stages often take longer in older adults, 
and because the task in this study required participants to categorise the stimuli according to 
their valence, it could be that the younger participants were faster at categorising stimuli as 
they were able to complete the early stages of information processing at a faster rate than 
older adults.  
 
Thus, whilst it is not exactly clear why such age-related differences in reaction rate exist, it is 
nevertheless undeniable that such age-related differences do exist. Having examined the 
implications of the results obtained from the descriptive statistics, it is time to look at the 
meaning of the results pertinent to the main aim of this study: did mental imagery have an 
effect on the reaction rate to emotionally valenced stimuli?  
 
 
5.2.5 Factorial ANOVA 
The primary aim of this study was to examine the hypotheses that engaging in negative 
imagery made a person more sensitive to negative stimuli, and that positive mental imagery 
enhanced a person’s sensitivity to positive stimuli (as was indicated in Section 2.7.3 of 
Chapter 2). The results of the factorial ANOVA support these hypotheses, and indicate that 
mental imagery does indeed increase the speed with which a person responds to emotionally 
valenced stimuli. The first analysis was representative of the degree to which the variance 
between participants’ reaction rates to emotionally valenced and neutral stimuli was affected 
by the type of mental imagery scenario. The results found (F=8.4057, DF=2,77, p=.0002) 
indicated that the type of mental imagery engaged in had a very noteworthy effect on how 
participants responded to stimuli. This finding is of central importance to this study, as it 
shows that the differences in the reaction rates between scenarios were likely to be caused by 
the scenarios themselves, rather than by a confounding factor. These results were supported 
by a post hoc test, discussed more fully below. 
 
Also central to this direct claim of causality is the second analysis which represented the 
significance of the variation in response rates caused by the different types of stimuli. In other 
words, this analysis denoted the degree to which changes in the reaction rates of the 
participants were caused by the valence of the stimulus. This ANOVA yielded (F=1.1877, 
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DF=2,77, p=0.3050), suggesting that the emotional valence had no significant effect on the 
rate at which the participants reacted to the stimuli in the various mental imagery conditions. 
When the first two ANOVA statistics are considered together, they show without doubt that 
the rate at which participants responded to the various stimuli was dependent on the type of 
mental imagery in which the participant had engaged in, and not dependent on any other 
single factor, such as the inherent characteristics of the emotionally valenced stimuli. Thus, as 
a separate factor, the emotional valence of the stimuli would not have had a strong enough 
effect to influence the rate at which participants responded to the stimuli. In other words, the 
emotional valence had a necessary but not sufficient effect on the rate at which participants 
reacted to the stimuli. 
 
The third and final ANOVA investigated the interaction was representative of the interaction 
between the two factors: in other words, this value was indicative of the degree to which the 
reaction rates were influenced by the type of mental imagery engaged in, and the emotional 
valence of the stimulus responded to. This analysis yielded (F=3.4576, DF=4,77, p=.00794), 
providing support for the hypothesis that the effect which each mental imagery scenario had 
on the reaction rate of the participants was tempered by the type of stimulus to which the 
participants were reacting. In other words, there were statistically significant differences in 
the variance between the reaction rates in the various conditions, and this variance was 
concurrent with the type of stimulus being responded to. From this result, it is possible to 
infer that different types of mental imagery affected reaction rates to different types of 
emotionally valenced stimuli in varying ways. 
. 
However, it is not sufficient to know that the interaction between the two factors was 
significant, one must also know how this interaction manifested itself. Put another way, it is 
vital not only to know that the interaction between the type of mental imagery and the 
emotional valence of the stimulus is significant, but it is important to look at how this 
affected each of the conditions separately. This may be inferred based on the averages 
presented in the ANOVA table (see Appendix 6 for the full ANOVA table).  
 
Following the neutral imagery condition, the average reaction rates to neutral stimuli and 
positively and negatively valenced stimuli were all fairly equal. If one considers this in 
combination with the insignificant p-value for the influence of the emotional valence of the 
stimuli, one comes to the conclusion that neutral mental imagery had no effect on the reaction 
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rate of participants to emotionally valenced stimuli of any kind. These findings support the 
hypothesis underlying this section, namely that the average reaction rate of the participants to 
neutral, positively valenced, and negatively valenced stimuli would be similar. This in turn 
supports the use of this condition as a control condition, as the neutral mental imagery did not 
have any effects on any of the reaction rates, thereby allowing the average reaction rates to be 
used as a base-line against which the reaction rates in the experimental conditions could be 
compared. 
 
After having engaged in the positive mental imagery, the average reaction rates of the 
participants were noticeably different to those obtained in the control condition. The average 
reaction rate to neutral stimuli remained similar to the reaction rate to neutral stimuli in the 
neutral imagery condition, thereby suggesting that this reaction rate had not been 
significantly affected by positive mental imagery. However, the average reaction rate of the 
participants to positive stimuli was much lower in the positive mental imagery condition than 
that in the neutral imagery condition. From this, one can conclude that engaging in positive 
mental imagery biased the participants to positively valenced stimuli, resulting in a faster 
reaction time to the positively valenced stimuli. The average reaction rate to negatively 
valenced stimuli on the other hand was less than the reaction rate to negative stimuli in the 
control condition, but notably slower than the average reaction rate to positive stimuli in the 
positive mental imagery condition.  These results therefore suggest that mental imagery 
increases the speed at which both positive and negative stimuli are responded to, although 
this increase is far more noteworthy in the case of positive stimuli than in the case of negative 
stimuli. The hypothesis underlying this condition was that engaging in positive mental 
imagery would increase the rate at which participants responded to positively valenced 
stimuli relative to the rate at which they would respond to neutral or negatively valenced 
stimuli. This hypothesis was clearly supported, and the factorial ANOVA did indeed show 
that there was a significant difference in the speed at which participants categorised the 
positively valenced stimuli when compared to other stimuli. What was surprising, however, 
was the slight increase in the rate at which participants responded to the negatively valenced 
stimuli. 
The negative mental imagery condition was set up in order to test the hypothesis that 
engaging in negative mental imagery would result in a faster reaction rate to negatively 
valenced stimuli relative to positively valenced and neutral stimuli. An examination of the 
average reaction rates to the various stimuli in this condition showed that the slowest 
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response rate was that to positively valenced stimuli, which was slightly slower than the 
average response rate to neutral stimuli. This was unexpected, as it was hypothesised (see 
Section 2.7.3) that the reaction rates to neutral stimuli would not be affected by any type of 
mental imagery. However, an alternative explanation for these results is that, as opposed to 
negative mental imagery slightly increasing the average reaction rate to neutral stimuli 
relative to positive stimuli, it is possible that the reaction rate to positive stimuli was slowed 
by the negative mental imagery to the point where the reaction rate to positive stimuli 
exceeded the reaction rate to neutral stimuli. This may help to explain why people suffering 
from depression engage with positive and negative information differently to how non-
depressed people engage with information. Levens and Gotlib (2010) found that individuals 
suffering from depression were slower at disengaging from negative information than people 
without depression, possibly indicating a reduction in the ability to update negative 
representations in working memory with positive or neutral ones, leading to perseveration of 
negative affect. Conversely, non-depressed individuals were slower at disengaging from 
positive information.  
 
The results of the current study support Levens and Gotlib’s (2010) claim concerning non-
depressed individuals, and indeed show that participants were slow to disengage from 
positive information, but only following the negative mental imagery scenario. Following the 
positive mental imagery, participants in the current study were faster at disengaging from 
positive information than negative information, as can be inferred from the faster reaction 
rates to positive stimuli relative to negative stimuli. This seems to suggest that the claims 
made by Levens and Gotlib (2010) about non-depressed individuals may be too generalised, 
and that a more in-depth examination of the differences between depressed and non-
depressed participants in the rates at which people disengage from positive and negative 
information after engaging in various types of mental imagery is necessary for a fuller 
understanding of how depression works. However, it remains unclear as to why negative 
mental imagery affected response rates to neutral stimuli, although it could also be theorised 
that engaging in mental imagery also slows reaction rates to neutral stimuli, rather than just 
merely increasing the rate at which negative stimuli are reacted to. 
 
The results in the negative mental imagery scenario also showed that the response rate to 
negatively valenced stimuli was greatly affected by the negative mental imagery. In fact, the 
response rate of participants to negatively valenced stimuli in the negative mental imagery 
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condition represented the overall fastest response rate. This in turn indicates that engaging in 
negative mental imagery makes a person more responsive to negative stimuli than the 
increase in responsiveness to positive stimuli caused by engaging in positive mental imagery. 
Moreover, the finding that negative mental imagery results in a bias towards negatively 
valenced stimuli unambiguously supports the theory that negative cognitive biases play a role 
in the maintenance of emotional disorders such as depression (Holmes et al., 2009; Mcleod et 
al., 2009; Lang et al., 2012). This theory states that a negative cognitive bias goes some way 
in explaining the causality of depression, with cognitive theories of depression ascribing the 
onset and the maintenance of depression to a negative interpretation bias (Lang et al., 2012), 
as discussed in section 1.4 of Chapter 1. This direct link between negative mental imagery 
and negative cognitive biases is vital not only to the understanding of how emotional 
disorders such as depression are maintained, but it also provides insights as to how new 
treatments can be created to combat such disorders.  
 
The results found through the ANOVA analysis were further strengthened through the use of 
Fisher’s LSD test. As can be seen in Appendix 7, there were no significant difference in 
reaction rates to the differently valenced stimuli following the neutral mental imagery 
condition. This was as expected, with the hypothesis set out in 2.7.3 stating that neutral 
imagery ought not to bias response rates to any particular type of stimulus, resulting in 
similar response rates to all three types of stimuli. In terms of the effect of positive mental 
imagery, it was hypothesised that positive mental imagery would bias responses towards 
positive stimuli, whilst not biasing response rates to negative or neutral stimuli (see Section 
2.7.3 for hypothesis). The post hoc test on the ANOVA values revealed a significant 
difference in response rates between neutral versus positive stimuli, and in positive versus 
negative stimuli, but failed to find a significant difference between negative and neutral 
stimuli. This again completely supports the hypothesis; positive mental imagery increased 
reaction rates to positive stimuli, but did not bias response rates to negative and neutral 
stimuli in this condition. Finally, in terms of the predictions underlying the negative mental 
imagery condition, it was hypothesised that engaging in negative mental imagery would bias 
responses to negatively valenced stimuli, but that positive and neutral stimuli would remain 
unbiased (again, see Section 2.7.3 for hypothesis). Once again, this hypothesis was fully 
supported by the results of the post hoc test: there was a significant difference in reaction 
rates between neutral versus negative stimuli, as well as between positive and negative 
stimuli, but there was no significant difference between positively and neutrally valenced 
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stimuli. In other words, there was a clear indication that negatively valenced stimuli had been 
biased in the negative mental imagery condition; an effect not seen for either positively or 
neutrally valenced stimuli. Thus, overall, the findings of the ANOVA and the post hoc LSD 
test completely supported the hypotheses made.   
 
Having concluded that engaging in mental imagery does indeed result in a bias towards 
processing certain stimuli faster than other stimuli, the question arises as to why this biasing 
occurs. Markman and Gentner (2005) noted that categorisation of stimuli involves a typically 
spontaneous drawing of similarities between the presented stimulus and stored category 
representations, as recognition of similarity allows a person to make generalisations about 
similar objects, thereby reducing the amount of cognitive resources needed to process a new 
stimulus. In other words, when deciding on which category to allocate a certain stimulus, 
participants first compared the presented stimulus with any pre-existing category 
representations which the participant already had. Moreover, similarities between stimuli may 
enhance cognitive processing by allowing certain properties of the stimuli to be more readily 
accessible. This cognitive bias allows new situations to be compared to past experience, 
which allows the person to make faster inferences about the new situation (Markman & 
Gentner, 2005), which is clearly advantageous from an evolutionary perspective. However, as 
stated by Lang et al. (2012), cognitive biases may become maladaptive, and this may play a 
role in the development of emotional disorders. However, given the recency of this field of 
study, further research into the exact mechanics underlying this phenomenon is necessary. 
 
 
5.2.6 Gender data 
Having looked at the results of the inferential statistics pertaining to the effects of mental 
imagery on overall reaction rate to emotionally valenced stimuli, it is time to discuss the 
results concerning one of the secondary aims of this study: namely, the gender related 
differences in the data obtained. As was discussed in Section 2.7.2, the hypothesis underlying 
this research aim was that there would be a difference in the rate at which males and females 
responded to emotionally valenced stimuli after engaging in mental imagery. These statistics 
not only reported how many incorrect categorisations were made by male participants relative 
to female participants, but also conveyed information regarding the average reaction rates at 
which the two genders responded to the stimuli used in the study. 
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Firstly, as can be seen in the descriptive statistics in section 4.1.5 in Chapter 4, males made 
almost twice the number of incorrect categorisations than did females. It is possible that the 
difference in the number of incorrect categorisations made between males and females may 
reflect a possible gender bias in the ANEW list. However, it may also indicate that males 
allocate a different valence to stimuli. Wager, Luan Phan, Liberzon, and Taylor (2003) point 
out that males process emotional information differently to females, with females having a 
stronger psychophysiological response to emotional stimuli than males. This may suggest 
that, in the case of the current study, female participants were able to categorise stimuli more 
correctly as their reaction to the emotionally valenced stimuli was stronger, and therefore less 
ambiguous, than the responses of male participants. Indeed, structural imaging studies have 
indicated that the cingulate cortex of females contains more grey matter than that of males, 
whilst functional studies have shown that the subcallosal anterior cingulate activates more 
frequently in female participants than in male participants in emotional valence 
responsiveness research (Wager et al., 2003). As the cingulate cortex forms an integral part of 
the limbic system, the system responsible for the processing of emotional information, this 
may form part of the underlying reason why females are more responsive to emotional 
information than are males (Wager et al., 2003). 
 
It was interesting to find that males and females responded to stimuli at significantly different 
rates in all three scenarios. The only exceptions to this were the responses to neutral and 
positive stimuli in the positive mental imagery condition. However, in all cases, females were 
faster at responding to stimuli than were the male participants. The largest discrepancy 
between the rates at which female participants and male participants responded to stimuli 
occurred in the neutral scenario, with the lowest differences in reaction rate being found in 
the positive scenario. These findings indicated that female participants were more responsive 
than male participants to all three types of stimuli following the neutral imagery scenario and 
the negative mental imagery scenario. This in turn supports findings such as those made by 
Lithari et al. (2009) who state that gender differences exist in how people respond to 
emotions and emotional stimuli, with females responding to emotional stimuli faster than 
males. Also consistent with the findings reported by Lithari et al. (2009) was that females are 
more responsive to threats than males. The results obtained in the current study also indicated 
that gender differences were greater following the negative mental imagery scenario than 
after the positive mental imagery scenario. As the negative stimuli used in this study were 
primarily selected for their relevance to the biological well-being of participants, the negative 
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stimuli contained in the study were threatening to the biological integrity of the participants. 
Thus, the increased sensitivity of the female participants to negative stimuli after all three 
types of mental imagery upholds the notion that females are more responsive to threatening 
stimuli than males, as is claimed by Lithari et al. (2009). 
 
Having reviewed all the results obtained, as well as having made inferences as to the meaning 
of these results, three things are clear. Firstly, in accordance with the main hypotheses 
presented in section 2.7 in Chapter 2, it is evident that various types of mental imagery have 
different effects on various types of emotionally valenced stimuli. In short, engaging in 
positive mental imagery creates a bias towards faster reactions to positive stimuli, whilst 
negative mental imagery biases participants towards decreased response times to negatively 
valenced stimuli. Secondly, it is also apparent that reaction rates to emotionally valenced 
stimuli after exposure to various types of mental imagery are significantly influenced by age, 
with younger adults having faster reaction rates and making fewer incorrect categorisations 
than older adults. Finally, these results also indicate noticeable differences in terms of gender: 
the number of incorrect categorisations made by males was twice as high as the number of 
incorrect categorisations made by females. Furthermore, in most of the conditions, females 
reacted at faster rates than males.  
 
Whilst the results of the data obtained in this study do indicate that engaging in mental 
imagery creates a cognitive bias which manifests itself as a preference in processing certain 
stimuli above others, it is vital for the validity of the study to consider whether there are any 
other possible alternative explanations for this preferential processing. Only one such 
alternative explanation presents itself: priming. This shall be further discussed in the 
following section. 
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5.3 Alternative explanation 
 
In order for a study to be considered internally valid, it is imperative that the observed results 
are not explainable through rival hypotheses (Cozby, 2005). Thus, consideration must be 
given to any other possible explanation for the results obtained in this study. In this case, it 
could be hypothesised that the mental imagery conditions primed the participants, which 
would have resulted in decreased reaction rates. Lexical priming can be said to occur when 
the linguistic context preceding a word alters the response to that word (Jones & Estes, 2012). 
In other words, a word which is related to the preceding context is recognised faster than 
unrelated words:  thus for example, if a participant were to be presented with a list 
comprising of the words “brown, blue, red, green, purple”, then the participant would 
recognise the word “yellow” faster than he or she would recognise the word “house”, due to 
the latter word being unrelated to the preceding context. As the stimuli words used in this 
study needed to be categorised, it can be said that participants were asked to make a semantic 
decision about each stimulus. As is noted by Jones and Estes (2012), semantic decisions 
require participants to pay closer attention to the stimuli than other priming measures, as 
participants are required to make inferences which increase the level of activation of the 
semantic representation of the stimulus. According to priming models, priming may either 
occur automatically or strategically, and may be either prospective or retrospective (Jones & 
Estes, 2012). In the case of prospective models, it is assumed that activation of the priming 
word activates all associated words including the target word, whilst retrospective models 
postulate that the priming word and the target word are considered simultaneously, with the 
target word being recognised faster if it is congruent with the priming word (Jones & Estes, 
2012). However, it must be noted that this study was not based on priming. Words presented 
in each of the stimuli lists were not related to the words used in the control conditions; rather 
each of the conditions was aimed at inducing emotional states which led to the formation of 
cognitive biases. Furthermore, had the results observed in this study been due to lexical 
priming, an increase in response rate would have been seen in all three experimental 
conditions. However, the fact that response rate was only significantly increased in the 
positive and negative conditions indicate that priming does not present a satisfactory 
explanation for the results obtained in this study. Moreover, other studies have shown that 
certain priming effects are, to a large extent, caused by bias (Zeelenberg et al., 2006). 
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Thus, whilst priming does present an alternative explanation for the observed results, this 
explanation is weak and unsatisfactory at best, thereby further strengthening the hypothesis 
that the results obtained in this study were a direct manifestation of an alteration in cognitive 
bias induced through the use of mental imagery. That having been said, it is still imperative to 
examine the limitations inherent in the current research.    
 
 
5.4 Limitations and their implications for future research 
 
Despite the fact that everything possible was done to ensure that this study was as valid and 
reliable as possible, there are a few limitations which shall now be discussed in the hope that 
these issues will be addressed in future research. These limitations include the lack of 
information on the temporal stability of the cognitive bias, the duration of the training 
sessions, the test-retest reliability of the study, and the inability to determine the underlying 
neural mechanisms. 
 
Whilst this study has identified the effects of mental imagery on cognitive biases, inferred 
through changes in reaction rate, there is no information on the temporal stability of such 
results. In other words, whilst it is clear that engaging in mental imagery does alter a person’s 
response rate to emotionally valenced stimuli, it is not clear how long this cognitive 
modification will last for, although it can be assumed that with the application of only a 
single training session, the effects of that training session soon become extinct. It would 
therefore be recommendable for future researchers to examine the temporal stability of such 
an induced cognitive bias modification, and perhaps to do research into the efficacy of 
multiple training sessions before this research could be fully utilised as a therapeutic method. 
However, recent work in the field of memory consolidation indicates that the emotional 
content of memories may be altered, albeit within a small window of the formation of the 
memory (Schiller, Monfils, Raio, Johnson, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2010). Nevertheless, such 
findings are encouraging insofar as they show that the emotional content attached to certain 
concepts may be altered. In the context of the current study, this highlights the possibility of 
using mental imagery as a technique to alter the emotional valence of stimuli. 
 
A related critique of the current study is the duration of the training session. It ought to be 
noted that the training sessions utilised in this study were of extremely short duration, which 
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may have resulted in the cognitive bias not being as strong as it might have been had the 
training sessions been longer. It is possible that the results of this study are not as strong as 
they might have been if each condition had more trials. For example, one study successfully 
trained participants to have an attentional bias either towards or away from anxiety-provoking 
stimuli. However, this was only possible after participants underwent a single training session 
with hundreds of trials (See et al., 2009). Nevertheless, despite this, the results obtained were 
highly significant, and demonstrate much potential for the future uses of similar 
interpretational bias retraining. Moreover, as the purpose of this research was primarily 
exploratory, keeping the training sessions short was acceptable. It is entirely possible that 
longer training sessions could have resulted in an ever stronger cognitive bias, manifested by 
an even greater difference in reaction rate in response to mental imagery. Therefore, it is 
recommendable for future studies interested in developing the therapeutic aspect of the 
current research to utilise longer interpretational bias retraining sessions, as such biases 
would be likely to be more robust.  
 
A further critique of the current study concerns the test-retest reliability of the instrument 
used. As the measure presented in the current study is not a formal measure, the test-retest 
reliability of this measure is unknown, which in turn means that the validity of the results 
cannot be fully ascertained. In a meta-analysis of attentional bias research, Cisler et al. (2009) 
report that the test-retest reliability of bias scores varies considerably from one instrument to 
another: more specifically, bias research using the Stroop task had lower test-retest reliability 
than did research conducted using the dot probe tasks. This conflict in test-retest reliability 
may be due to the fact that these instruments measure distinct processes. In other words, 
differences in test-retest reliability may arise because the Stroop test requires inhibition of 
responses, whilst the dot probe task necessitates attention to be allocated to certain stimuli 
(Cisler et al., 2009).  Thus, it is recommended that future research be done to determine the 
test-retest reliability of the current measurement instrument. In addition to this, the 
confidence in the obtained results could have increased had the analysis been done using 
statistical analysis software specifically designed to run tests such as 3-way ANOVAs or 
Levene’s tests.  
 
Finally, one ought to also bear in mind that as the current study focused on response rates, it 
is only possible to ascertain whether or not a phenomenon took place. Again, as this research 
was exploratory in nature, this is an acceptable limitation, as it is important to first establish 
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that a phenomenon does indeed exist before efforts are made into understanding the exact 
mechanisms underlying the phenomenon. As this current study only utilised response rates 
from which to infer the conclusions, it was impossible to uncover the exact mechanisms 
which resulted in the observed phenomenon. In other words, whilst the results of this study 
showed that mental imagery induced a cognitive bias towards certain stimuli, it could not 
pinpoint how this induction of a bias occurred. However, as this research established that 
mental imagery can indeed induce a cognitive bias, it is up to future research to elucidate how 
this phenomenon occurs. 
 
In short, although this study had several limitations, these limitations were acceptable for an 
exploratory research study, with the majority of the limitations representing topics beyond the 
scope of this study. Having established what the limitations of the current research were, it is 
time to discuss what contributions were made to the field of CBM research.  
 
 
5.5 Contributions and their implications for future research 
 
The contributions of this research to psychological knowledge are two-fold: namely, the 
current study has both theoretical and practical implications which shall each be separately 
explored below. 
 
 
5.5.1 Theoretical implications 
The results of the current research, when taken together with existing research, have provided 
empirical justification for the hypothesis that mental imagery can be used in the modification 
of cognitive biases in non-clinical populations.   
 
Through the use of a non-clinical sample, the results of this study were more externally valid 
than those of previous studies in the field of CBM, as they may be generalised to a much 
wider population. Because claims of causality cannot be inferred when using a clinical 
population due to the possible confounding factors inherent in such a population, and as this 
study conducted research on a non-clinical population, this has provided vital knowledge 
which can now be generalised to a larger proportion of the general population. Thus, one of 
the primary contributions of this study was the provision of evidence which was lacking in 
research which used clinical samples.  
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A further theoretical implication of this study concerns models on how emotional disorders 
arise. This study has shown that engaging in negative mental imagery does indeed create a 
cognitive bias which biases participants to responding to negative stimuli faster than positive 
stimuli. If this is considered together with previous findings which suggest that negative 
biases play a role in the development of multiple emotional disorders (Holmes et al., 2007; 
Bar-Haim, 2010; MacLeod et al., 2009), then the results of this study go some way in not 
only helping to clarify why emotional disorders develop, but also may inform theories on 
what risk factors are inherent in the development of emotional disorders. In other words, as 
this study shows that negative mental imagery leads to negative cognitive biases, and as 
previous research shows that negative cognitive biases play a role in the development and 
maintenance of emotional disorders (Holmes et al., 2007; Bar-Haim, 2010; MacLeod et al., 
2009), then it can be assumed that negative mental imagery could be one of the factors which 
contribute to the development and maintenance of several emotional disorders. This in turn 
has important implications for models of emotional disorder development, and this study 
illustrates that the presence of negative mental imagery ought to be considered when 
examining such models. 
 
In addition to these theoretical contributions, the current research also has several important 
implications for future clinical research. These contributions will be explored in the following 
subsection. 
 
 
5.5.2 Clinical implications 
Recent studies indicate that as many as one in five people will be diagnosed with depression 
(Levens & Gotlib, 2010), making depression the most prevalent mood disorder. It is therefore 
vital to not only find ways of identifying individuals at risk, but also to increase the efficacy 
of current treatment methods where possible, as well as to find ways of preventing a relapse 
in those at risk of reverting to maladaptive thinking patterns. Studies have shown that the 
presence of a negative intrusive imagery in a non-clinical population is correlated with the 
risk of future diagnosis of depression, whilst the absence of positive mental imagery has been 
found to play a role in the maintenance of depression (Holmes et al., 2009). These findings, 
when taken together with those obtained in the current study, suggest that future studies may 
be able to develop a measure which identifies those at risk of depression through their 
94 
 
reaction time to emotionally valenced stimuli after having engaged in mental imagery. 
Similarly, positive mental imagery training may, with further development, be used in the 
therapeutic treatment of depression, whilst a measure modelled around the findings of the 
current study could be used to quantitatively keep track of the progress which patients make. 
This in turn suggests that the results of this research have a wide range of implications for 
various clinical applications, which will now be further discussed. 
 
Although this research was theoretical, the findings could have important practical uses. Due 
to the success of recent CBM-I studies, researchers are beginning to uncover how clinical 
disorders are formed and maintained, and are also making progress towards being able to use 
cognitive biases as a treatment for such disorders (Holmes et al., 2009). The findings of this 
study are distinctive in that the results were drawn from a non-clinical population. These 
results are therefore also indicative of the potential contributions this study has to offer 
clinical populations in terms of increased psychological well-being. As is pointed out by 
Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, and Mackintosh (2006), the experimental modification of 
cognitive biases has shown much promise in the possibility of creating new treatment 
methods for emotional disorders. Most noticeably, the current research has important 
potential applications in therapy and counselling, especially in the treatment of emotional 
disorders. In the case of the potential of the findings in therapy, Lang et al. (2012) indicate 
that biases are prevalent in many emotional disorders, even though the exact mechanisms 
vary from one disorder to another. Therefore, a better understanding of the normative role of 
cognitive biases and their effects on reaction time to emotional stimuli could increase the 
effectiveness of therapy methods. Thus, one of the primary clinical implications of the results 
found in this research indicated that negative mental imagery leads to negative biases, whilst 
positive mental imagery results in positive cognitive biases. This in turn indicates that 
therapeutic attempts ought to be made in preventing negative mental imagery whilst 
simultaneously promoting the use of positive mental imagery. 
 
A further contribution made by this study was to address the dearth of normative research. As 
much of the research conducted in the field of CBM has been done on interpretation biases 
and cognitive biases in clinical populations, normative research is lacking. Although clinical 
trials are vital in the understanding and treatment of clinical disorders, this lack of normative 
research still represents a limitation of the potential scope of the research. For example, such 
research could have important implications in increasing the quality of life in a normative 
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population, or in dealing with non-clinical negative affect. Thus, the results of this study can 
be seen as a first step in examining cognitive biases in a normative sample. Moreover, the 
results of this study provide a foundation on which to base future research which could 
examine the presence of cognitive biases in order to aid in the identification of people at risk 
of developing emotional disorders or may even be used to help in prevention efforts in those 
at risk. For example, as a negative cognitive bias in a person’s cognitive style contributes to a 
higher risk of developing clinical depression (Lang et al., 2012), the results of the current 
study can be used to create a measure of the extent of a person’s negative bias. With further 
research, this can be developed into a measure of the degree to which a person is at risk of 
developing clinical depression on the basis of the severity of their negative cognitive bias. 
 
Furthermore, this study has demonstrated that a positive cognitive bias can be induced 
through the use of positive mental imagery, and it is hoped that future research may be able to 
transform this finding into a viable therapeutic method. Also importantly, See et al. (2009) 
report that daily exposure to cognitive bias modification procedures can have a lasting effect 
on how stimuli are interpreted which persists after such exposure is discontinued, which 
strengthens the suggestion that the results of this study do indeed hold therapeutic potential. 
In addition to this, even though the current sample stemmed from a non-clinical population, 
the results of this study are also applicable to clinical populations because of their therapeutic 
potential, both as a standalone therapy and as an addition to an existing therapeutic regime. 
As this study did indeed show that mental imagery causes cognitive biases, it is possible that 
people with emotional disorders could be taught to interpret everyday events in a more 
positive manner, which in turn could lessen their emotional distress and thereby increase their 
quality of life. Whilst therapy in which people are told to try look at life more positively (for 
example by employing the Socratic method of questioning to examine the truth of their 
beliefs) has met with some success (Hoppitt et al., 2010), the use of mental imagery to induce 
a positive cognitive bias could yield far more significant results. 
 
By establishing a positive cognitive bias, one may even establish a virtuous cycle in which 
positive mental imagery leads to a more positive outlook, which may facilitate more effective 
positive mental imagery, which further strengthens the positive cognitive bias, which may in 
turn result in an even more positive outlook. More impressively, such a situation would 
ideally be possible with only a minimal amount of therapist involvement: beyond a basic 
training in mental imagery practices, a person suffering from or at risk of depression would 
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be able to completely regulate their own therapeutic regimes according to their own personal 
needs. Some findings even suggest that a remote delivery of related therapeutic methods, for 
example via the Internet, has comparable efficacy to therapist-delivered interventions 
(MacLeod et al., 2009), thereby further increasing the credibility of such a potential 
therapeutic method. Furthermore, whilst such a therapy may not work in severe cases of 
depression, such a method may be useful in the prevention of reoccurrences of depression, 
making a relapse into the use of old, maladaptive cognitive biases less likely.  
 
It is also hoped that the results of this study can be used to help people foster resilience. 
Resilience can be described as the capability to manage negative events through the use of 
positive emotions (Levens & Gotlib, 2010). Findings have indicated that the contents of 
working memory can affect a person’s mood, with some researchers suggesting that 
maladaptive emotional updating of working memory may play a role in the development and 
maintenance of some emotional disorders such as depression (Levens & Gotlib, 2010). As 
suggested by Levens and Gotlieb (2010), keeping negative representations active in working 
memory may increase the risk of developing depression, whilst an increase in the activation 
of positive representations in working memory may increase the resilience of the person. This 
suggests that using positive mental imagery to increase the activation of positive 
representations could increase psychological well-being, and may help protect people at risk 
from emotional disorders. In light of the observations made in this study, this seems to 
suggest that mental imagery can be used to avoid keeping negative representations active, as 
well as increasing the number of positive representations active, thereby simultaneously 
decreasing the risk of depression whilst increasing the resilience to depression. 
 
However, if the findings made in the current research are to be used in the development of a 
therapeutic method, there are some weaknesses which ought to be kept in mind. One such 
downside would be the willingness of the person to engage in the mental imagery. Whilst 
being able to identify potentially threatening stimuli faster is adaptive in that it helps a person 
prepare for or cope with danger, it is uncertain why maladaptive and excessive anxiety is so 
persistent (Hirsch et al., 2009). Hirsch et al. (2009) noted that those who suffer from 
excessive worries may have little motivation to change their status quo, due to their 
endorsement of the positive effects of higher anxiety. For example, some patients with 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder claim that high levels of anxiety are beneficial in that they 
facilitate problem solving through excessive worrying until the problem is solved (Hirsch et 
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al., 2009). Thus, although this study illustrates the potential application of mental imagery in 
a therapeutic setting, one must bear in mind that some participants may be unwilling to fully 
engage in mental imagery due to their beliefs that some aspects of a particular disorder may 
be beneficial. Additionally, due to the self-delivery nature, such a potential therapeutic 
method would only work if the person actively engages in it. Due to the decreased therapist 
intervention, some people could struggle with getting into the routine of utilising mental 
imagery. 
 
In summary, the results of this study have numerous important and fascinating implications, 
particularly for the field of emotional disorders and their treatment. However, as this research 
was an exploratory first step, it is hoped that future research may realise some of the potential 
applications hinted at in this study. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
  
To date, research into CBM has been limited, considering the potential applications it has to 
offer. There has been little to no research on the use of both positive and negative mental 
imagery to alter existing biases; the current experiment was therefore an important first step 
in examining how positive and negative mental imagery can be combined with existing CBM 
techniques, the results of which were very encouraging.  
  
The findings of the current study support the notion that mental imagery can successfully be 
used to alter cognitive biases, with negative mental imagery evoking a negative bias, and 
positive mental imagery inducing a positive cognitive bias. These findings have numerous 
implications for the field of emotional disorders, from informing existing models on how 
negative mental imagery can lead to negative cognitive biases which can play a role in the 
development of depression, to providing a basis for potential new therapeutic measures which 
could possibly be used to treat, prevent, or diagnose emotional disorders such as depression.  
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Appendix 1: List of negative stimuli used, including valence and arousal scores 
 
The following negative stimuli were presented in a randomised order by the computer 
program, with five of these stimuli being presented after each of the mental imagery 
conditions. Below are the valence and arousal scores for each of the stimuli, as found in the 
ANEW list (Bradley & Lang, 2010). 
 
 
 Valence Arousal 
1. Abuse 1.80 6.83 
2. Death 1.61 4.59 
3. Suffocate 1.56 6.03 
4. Agony 2.42 6.06 
5. Disaster 1.73 6.33 
6. Torture 1.56 6.10 
7. Infection 1.66 5.03 
8. Depression 1.85 4.54 
9. Poison  1.98 6.05 
10. Betray 1.68 7.24 
11. Suicide 1.25             5.73 
12. Cancer 1.50 6.42 
13. Hurt 1.90 5.85 
14. Funeral 1.39 4.94 
15. Terrorist 1.69 7.27 
 
In the initial training phase of the computer program, the neutral stimulus “paralysis” was 
used, with a valence of 1.98, and an arousal value of 4.73 (Bradley & Lang, 2010). 
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Appendix 2: List of positive stimuli used, including valence and arousal scores 
 
The following positive stimuli were presented in a randomised order by the computer 
program, with five of these stimuli being presented after each of the mental imagery 
conditions. Below are the valence and arousal scores for each of the stimuli, as found in the 
ANEW list (Bradley & Lang, 2010).         
 
 
 Valence Arousal 
1. Free 8.26 5.15 
2. Life 7.27 6.02 
3. Delight 8.26 5.44 
4. Pleasure 8.28 5.74 
5. Kiss 8.26 7.32 
6. Cash 8.37 7.37 
7. Love 8.72 6.44 
8. Happy 8.21 6.49 
9. Baby 8.22 5.53 
10. Triumphant 8.82 6.78 
11. Champion 8.44 5.85 
12. Joy 8.60 7.22 
13. Victory 8.32 6.63 
14. Affection 8.39 6.21 
15. Passion 8.03 7.26 
 
 
In the initial training phase of the computer program, the neutral stimulus “Hug” was used, 
with a valence of 8.00, and an arousal value of 5.35 (Bradley & Lang, 2010). 
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Appendix 3: List of neutral stimuli used, including valence and arousal scores 
 
The following neutral stimuli were presented in a randomised order by the computer 
program, with five of these stimuli being presented after each of the mental imagery 
conditions. Below are the valence and arousal scores for each of the stimuli, as found in the 
ANEW list (Bradley & Lang, 2010). 
 
 Valence Arousal 
1. Pencil 5.22 3.14 
2. Barrel 5.05 3.63 
3. Square 4.74 3.18 
4. Contents 4.89 4.32 
5. Umbrella 5.16 3.68 
6. Knot 4.75 4.07 
7. News 5.30 5.17 
8. Table 5.22 2.92 
9. Bench 4.61 3.59 
10. Statue 5.17 3.46 
11. Paper 5.20 2.50 
12. Rain 5.08 3.65 
13. Bus 4.51 3.55 
14. Curtains             4.83 3.62 
15. Poster  5.34 3.93 
 
 
In the initial training phase of the computer program, the neutral stimulus “Street” was used, 
with a valence of 5.22, and an arousal value of 3.39 (Bradley & Lang, 2010). 
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Appendix 4: Control and experimental mental imagery conditions used 
 
Control condition: Neutral imagery: 
Imagine yourself having an ordinary, average day, just like many other days you have had 
before. You are walking on the pavement next to a familiar road during the afternoon. It is 
fairly busy, and there are several people about. There are quite a few cars driving past, but the 
traffic is light. A gust of wind blows down the street, making the leaves on the trees rustle. 
You know this route well, so you barely notice the buildings next to you as you walk by. You 
suddenly hear a car hoot, and you turn around to look, to find out why the car hooted, but 
nothing is out of the ordinary. You turn back around and carry on with your walk. 
 
Experimental condition 1: Positive imagery: 
Imagine that it is a bright sunny weekend, and you are in a very good mood. The weather is 
perfect, neither too hot nor too cold, but just how you like it. Everything is looking up, and 
you have a big smile on your face. You have no obligations, and can do whatever you like 
this weekend. You feel eager and excited for a wonderful, fun break. You put on the radio, 
and your favourite band is playing. Imagine yourself feeling happy, relaxed and content with 
life. You sit down to plan your weekend, thinking about all the other great weekends you’ve 
had with your loved-ones. You can feel that you’re going to have a great weekend filled with 
cheerfulness. 
 
Experimental condition 2: Negative Imagery: 
Imagine that you have had a very bad day. You are fighting with a loved-one, who is blaming 
you for something you did not do, and you feel hurt and disappointed that they do not believe 
you. The fight does not go well, and you end up being asked to leave. As you walk to your 
car, you get very cold. Picture yourself freezing as you run to your car. When you finally get 
to the car, you get in, shivering and thinking about the argument. Envision yourself putting 
the key in the ignition, but the car won’t start. You know you will probably have to spend a 
lot of money getting your car fixed. You are cold and miserable, and have a lot of problems. 
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Appendix 5: Age-related average reaction rates 
 
Age Group  Neutral Stimuli Positive Stimuli Negative Stimuli 
18-19 
Neutral 
Scenario 
1350 1355 1272 
Positive 
Scenario 
1241 1110 1296 
Negative 
Scenario 
1213 1348 1432 
 
20-29 
Neutral 
Scenario 
1502 1473 1508 
Positive 
Scenario 
1486 1341 1494 
Negative 
Scenario 
1506 1489 1406 
 
30-39 
Neutral 
Scenario 
1374 1452 1466 
Positive 
Scenario 
1524 1612 1394 
Negative 
Scenario 
1318 1404 1361 
 
40-49 
Neutral 
Scenario 
1655 1684 1890 
Positive 
Scenario 
1570 1477 1597 
Negative 
Scenario 
1531 1522 1417 
 
50-59 
Neutral 
Scenario 
1336 1574 1497 
Positive 
Scenario 
1247 1324 1373 
Negative 
Scenario 
1393 1440 1338 
 
60-69 
Neutral 
Scenario 
2372 1906 2115 
Positive 
Scenario 
2034 1566 1624 
Negative 
Scenario 
1876 1935 1581 
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Appendix 6: Factorial ANOVA results 
 
Anova: Two factor analysis of variance with replication 
 
SUMMARY Neutral 
Stimuli 
Positive 
Stimuli 
Negative 
Stimuli 
Total   
Neutral Scenario           
Count 400 400 400 1200   
Sum 610780 605626 621221 1837627   
Average 1526.95 1514.065 1553.0525 1531.355833   
Variation 259147.6416 173813.6449 203975.9647 212221.5305   
       
Positive Scenario           
Count 400 400 400 1200   
Sum 602945 565313 592732 1760990   
Average 1507.3625 1413.2825 1481.83 1467.491667   
Variation 252299.5199 253070.6393 186368.5224 231774.2251   
       
Negative Scenario           
Count 400 400 400 1200   
Sum 588877 596597 563329.3333 1748803.333   
Average 1472.1925 1491.4925 1408.323333 1457.336111   
Variation 244568.9629 168539.0024 326957.8963 247541.3913   
       
Total           
Count 1200 1200 1200    
Sum 1802602 1767536 1777282.333    
Average 1502.168333 1472.946667 1481.068611    
Variation 252098.6639 200009.7436 242196.2511    
 
 
ANOVA       
Source of 
Variation 
SS df MS F P-value F-Crit 
Sample 3864274.548 2 1932137.274 8.405706074 0.000228017 2.998232804 
Columns 546028.0249 2 273014.0124 1.187739388 0.305029523 2.998232804 
Interaction 3179035.22 4 794758.8049 3.457574678 0.007935206 2.374406598 
Error 825427975.9 3591 229860.1994    
       
Total 833017313.7 3599         
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Appendix 7: LSD Group Mean Differences 
As the critical value for Fisher’s LSD was calculated to be 55.77, any mean difference 
between groups larger than this critical value indicates a significant effect. Group differences 
for the various scenarios are given in the tables below, and any value exceeding the critical 
value is indicated by the light grey shading of the relevant cell.  
Neutral 
Scenario 
 Neutral Stimuli Positive Stimuli Negative Stimuli 
Mean 1526.95 1514.07 1553.05 
Neutral Stimuli 1526.95 _   
Positive Stimuli 1514.07 12.88 _  
Negative Stimuli 1553.05 -26.10 -38.98 _ 
 
Positive 
Scenario 
 Neutral Stimuli Positive Stimuli Negative Stimuli 
Mean 1507.36 1413.28 1481.83 
Neutral Stimuli 1507.36 _   
Positive Stimuli 1413.28 94.08 _  
Negative Stimuli 1481.83 25.53 -68.55 _ 
 
Negative 
Scenario 
 Neutral Stimuli Positive Stimuli Negative Stimuli 
Mean 1472.19 1491.49 1408.32 
Neutral Stimuli 1472.19 _   
Positive Stimuli 1491.49 -19.3 _  
Negative Stimuli 1408.32 63.87 83.17 _ 
 
